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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines the main drivers of U.S. policy toward North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program from 1992 until the present. The thesis has found that there 
were four main drivers of American policy toward North Korea during each presidential 
administration examined. The United States’ regional allies—Japan and South 
Korea—have been concerned about the threats posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program, and they have made several attempts to negotiate the denuclearization of the 
Korean peninsula in the conjunction with the United States. Allies’ concerns about a 
potential conflict, however, have led them to call on the United States to show restraint in 
the use of military force and economic pressure toward North Korea. China’s economic 
leverage over the DPRK and Beijing’s insistence on preventing the United States from 
imposing harsher economic sanctions on North Korea presented challenges throughout 
the presidential administrations. North Korea’s insistence on furthering its nuclear 
weapons program by continuing to defy the international order presents difficulties for 
the United States to achieve the goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. This thesis 
provides two future policy recommendations for the United States to engage with North 
Korea—adopt either an option of appeasement that centers on diplomacy or an option of 
pressure that relies on a combination of coercive strategies to successfully achieve the 
goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. 
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1 
I. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN RELATION TO NORTH KOREA 
The United States and its allies have attempted to negotiate with North Korea 
regarding its nuclear weapons program over the span of four U.S. presidencies with little 
success. In 2020, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program still poses a major threat to the 
United States. U.S. national interest depends upon the security, liberty, and property of the 
American people, and North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is a threat to these national 
interests.1 The weapons testing conducted by North Korea poses major security risks to the 
U.S. troops stationed in East Asia as well as to the freedom of navigation in both the Korean 
peninsula and the Sea of Japan. North Korea has demonstrated that the country possesses 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) with ranges capable of reaching the United 
States.2 To improve relations with North Korea, President Donald Trump became the first 
U.S. president to accept an invitation to meet with a North Korean leader in almost two 
decades, and he has since met twice with President Kim Jong-un to discuss nuclear 
disarmament of the Korean peninsula.3  
However, the United States and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
negotiations regarding the North’s nuclear weapons program stalled in 2019. The weapons 
testing conducted by the DPRK has continually increased security concerns in East Asia 
and has led to an increase in tensions between North Korea and the United States. U.S. 
policy concerning denuclearizing North Korea cycles between appeasement (carrot), and 
engagement (stick) based off the soft and hardline strategies employed by the DPRK.4 The 
United States appeases North Korea by offering concessions such as economic sanctions 
 
1 Adam Quinn, “Obama’s National Security Strategy: Predicting U.S. Policy in the Context of 
Changing Worldviews” (Chatham House-The Royal Institute of International Affairs, January 2015), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/obamas-national-security-strategy-predicting-us-policy-
context-changing-worldviews#. 
2 Kelsey Davenport, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms 
Control Association, January 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron. 
3 Stephen Collinson, “Trump Isn’t the First U.S. President to Get a North Korean Invite. But He Is the 
First to Accept,” CNN, March 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/09/politics/north-korea-trump-obama-
bush-clinton/index.html. 
4 Nordin b. Abdul Ghani, “North Korea’s Foreign Policy Patterns towards Major Powers: From the 
Cold War Era until the Post-Cold War Era,” The Journal of Defence and Security 6, no. 2 (2015): 74–86. 
2 
relief, or financial assistance, and in return North Korea would agree to dismantle its 
nuclear weapons program.  
This paper examined the major drivers of U.S. policy in relation to North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program. There are many different scholarly explanations of what drives 
U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea. One explanation posited by scholars is that 
American policy toward North Korea lacks consistency because it changes depending on 
each presidential administration’s national security interests and focus. Another 
explanation given by scholars is that the economic leverage that China has over North 
Korea is the most important factor affecting U.S. policymakers progress in respect to 
halting the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program because it makes the economic sanctions 
less effective.5 Other scholars point to the bilateral military alliances with South Korea and 
Japan, which obligates the United States to provide these allies with security and influences 
American policy concerning the DPRK.6 On the other hand, some analysts believe that 
North Korea’s bellicose, belligerent behavior marks them as deeply radical and dangerous, 
therefore making it difficult to enforce American policy.7  This thesis determined there has 
been multiple drivers of U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea from the Clinton 
administration to the present.  
A. SIGNIFICANCE 
North Korea is one of the United States’ most pressing security challenges because 
of the threat that it poses to U.S. troops and allies in the region. This is a major reason why 
the United States, along with the United Nations, has attempted to negotiate with North 
 
5 Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin, “China-North Korea Relations,” North Korean Review 7, no. 2 
(2011): 94–101, https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.7.2.94. 
6 Emma Chanlett-Avery et al., “North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal 
Situation,” CRS Report No. R41259 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 27, 2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf. 
7 Danielle Chubb, “A Nuclear North Korea and the Limitations of U.S. Security Perspectives,” 
Critical Studies on Security 5, no. 3 (December 2, 2017): 317–32, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2017.1409560. 
3 
Korea regarding its nuclear weapons program.8  North Korea began developing its nuclear 
weapons program around the end of the Cold War; however, they did not effectively have 
nuclear power capabilities until the 21st century. In July and November of 2017, North 
Korea began expanding its nuclear weapons program and test launched three inter-
continental ballistic missiles that demonstrated ranges capable of reaching the United 
States.9  
These recent developments increased the urgency of understanding the drivers of 
U.S. foreign policy strategy toward North Korea. The DPRK’s nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missile capabilities not only pose a threat to the Republic of Korea, they also 
endanger the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed inside South Korea.10 The U.S. troops stationed 
in South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) place the country under the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella.11 South Korea is also one of the United States most strategic economic partners 
in Asia and its sixth-largest trading partner.12 After the Korean War the United States and 
South Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty that commits the United States to help South 
Korea defend itself from threats.13 The threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program 
to ROK falls under the Mutual Defense Treaty, which is another reason why the United 
States has continued to address the issue of nuclear disarmament in North Korea.  
North Korea’s nuclear weapons and long-range missile launches have increased 
Japanese security fears about the capabilities and intentions of the regime.14 The United 
States relationship with Japan started upon the conclusion of World War II with the signing 
 
8 Markus B. Liegl, “Maximum Pressure—Deferred Engagement: Why Trump’s North Korea Policy Is 
Unwise, Dangerous, and Bound to Fail,” Global Affairs 3, no. 4–5 (February 1, 2018): 365–77, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2017.1416791. 
9 Liegl, “Maximum Pressure—Deferred Engagement,” 365. 
10 Brock Williams, “South Korea: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional research 
(Washington, D.C., August 1, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10165.pdf. 
11 Williams, “South Korea: Background and U.S. Relations,” 1. 
12 Andres B. Schwarzenberg, “U.S. Trade with Major Trading Partners,” CRS Report No. R45434 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 18, 2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45434.pdf. 
13 Williams, “South Korea: Background and U.S. Relations,” 1. 
14 Emma Chanlett-Avery et al., “Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress” (Washington, D.C., 
February 16, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33436.pdf. 
4 
of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960.15 The alliance formed from this 
treaty has been an anchor for the U.S. security role in East Asia and with more than 53,000 
U.S. troops stationed in the region Japan falls under the United States nuclear umbrella.16 
Japan is the United States fourth-largest trading partner in terms of exports and imports.17 
Resolving the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program would aid in alleviating 
any fears from our Japanese ally, thereby further strengthening the United States and Japan 
alliance.  
Another reason this thesis is significant is because it helps to understand the 
effectiveness of the various policy tools that the United States use to promote nuclear non-
proliferation and ensure signatory countries adhere to the terms of the Non-proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), which was signed in March of 1970.18  One tool the 
United States employ to those ends is issuing and enforcing economic sanctions on 
countries, which defy international law as defined by the United Nations. The United States 
also use political isolation as well as its military presence and exercises with allies as a tool 
for nuclear deterrence. 
North Korea has a history of being able to circumnavigate the pressure of the United 
States economic sanctions. The DPRK regularly defies international law especially 
regarding nuclear proliferation. Although North Korea signed the NPT in 1985, it never 
really complied with the treaty and was still developing a nuclear weapons program.19 In 
2003 North Korea officially withdrew from the NPT and continued to build up its nuclear 
weapons program.20 Allowing a country to produce nuclear weapons without proper 
monitoring places the entire world at risk because there is no security in place preventing 
 
15 Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “U.S. Relations with Japan” (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of State, July 17, 2018), https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-japan/. 
16 Chanlett-Avery et al., “Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress” 18. 
17 Schwarzenberg, “U.S. Trade with Major Trading Partners,” 29. 
18 Daryl Kimball, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) at a Glance,” Arms Control 
Association, August 2012, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nptfact. 
19 Abdul Ghani, “North Korea’s Foreign Policy patterns towards major Powers: From the Cold War 
Era until the Post-Cold War Era,” 78. 
20 Kimball, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) at a Glance,” 2. 
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that country from utilizing its weapons against other nations. This poses a national security 
risk not only to the United States and its allies but to many other countries within Asia, 
including China. If the North Korean problem is not resolved it may contribute to other 
rogue nations like Iran continuing its quest of developing a nuclear weapons program.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Presidential Administrations 
Presidential administrations are one of the main proponents of U.S. policy. 
Although President Clinton, Bush, Obama, and President Trump have utilized the process 
of economic sanctions in relation to North Korea for the purpose of nuclear non-
proliferation or disarmament, each administration took a different path. It is important to 
understand that the basic policy goal of U.S. foreign policy in respect to promoting non-
proliferation in North Korea are providing our allies with security, and maintaining peace 
and regional stability in east Asia.21 However, each U.S. president has employed different 
strategies to achieve the goal of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula.  
The Clinton administration took on an engagement strategy in relation to policy 
concerning North Korea.22 During the Clinton administration, North Korea had a secret 
nuclear weapons program; however, it had not yet developed a nuclear weapon. Therefore, 
the Clinton administration goals were to prevent the rogue nation from developing nuclear 
weapon capabilities. It was with this concern in mind that the Clinton administration 
engaged with North Korea through negotiations and successfully reached the 1994 U.S.-
DPRK Agreed Framework deal. The 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework deal was a 
bilateral deal that called for an end to North Korea nuclear development in return for U.S. 
economic and energy assistance.23  
 
21 William A. Boik, “Understanding the North Korea Problem: Why It Has Become the ‘Land of 
Lousy Options’” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011). 
22 Ralph B.A. DiMuccio and Kym-Gu Kang, “The Irony of U.S. Policy towards North Korea,” Peace 
Review 10, no. 2 (1998): 275–80. 
23 Boik, “Understanding the North Korea Problem,” 7. 
6 
North Korea nullified the 1994 Agreed Framework deal during President Bush’s 
first term in office. During the time that the DPRK’s second secret nuclear weapons 
program was exposed the United States was fighting the war on terrorism in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. The Bush administration employed a hardline policy concerning North Korea, 
which consisted of increased sanctions and pressure. The Bush administration felt as 
though the issue in North Korea moved passed the bilateral phase and into a multilateral 
phase and required interaction from countries in the region who considered a nuclear North 
Korea a threat. Therefore, in late 2003, in response to North Korea’s admission of the 
existence of its nuclear weapons program the six-party talks begin. The six-party talks were 
negotiations between the United States, Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, and North 
Korea regarding the dismantling of the nuclear weapons program in Pyongyang.24  
The focus of the Obama administration foreign policy was non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in rogue nations.25 The administration adopted a strategy of “strategic 
patience” with the goal of complete disarmament of the nuclear weapons program in North 
Korea.26  In the beginning of the Obama administration the goal was to achieve a nuclear 
free world with contingencies in place for wayward countries that break the rules.27 
Initially, President Obama was open to the possibility of speaking with Kim Jung-ll of 
North Korea and resuming the Six-party talks. However, the possibility of continuing 
nuclear weapons discussions between the United States and North Korea became 
compromised when North Korea launched sequential attacks on South Korea. This attack 
was a determining factor for the Obama administration to put a stop to any chance of actual 
negotiations with North Korea until the regime could take the United States security 
concerns seriously.  
 
24 Juergen Kliener, “The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by North Korea,” 
Diplomacy and Statecraft 16, no. 2 (2005): 203–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592290590948432. 
25 Christine Ahn, “More U.S. Pressure on North Korea is not the path to Denuclearization,” Truthout, 
May 9, 2019, https://truthout.org/articles/more-us-pressure-on-north-korea-is-not-the-path-to-
denuclearization/. 
26 Tanguy Struye de Swielande, “Obama’s Legacy and the Way Forward,” Global Affairs 3, no. 4–5 
(September 19, 2017): 325–36, https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2017.1377627. 
27 Chubb, “A Nuclear North Korea and the Limitations of U.S. Security Perspectives,” 324. 
7 
The Trump administration developed a maximum pressure engagement strategy 
regarding foreign policy toward North Korea.28 The strategy of maximum pressure toward 
North Korea consists of increasing diplomatic, economic, and military pressure against 
North Korea.29 This new strategy comprises of the following four elements: encourage 
Beijing to apply pressure on North Korea, increasing economic and financial sanctions, 
hardening Washington’s bargaining position, and building up military threat posture 
against Pyongyang.30 Through the application of these four elements the goal is to 
maximize pressure on North Korea to force them into a perilous situation; both 
economically and financially.  
2. American Allies Security 
Another school of scholarship contends that the major driver of U.S. policy in 
relation to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is the United States support for its East 
Asian allies. Scholars have determined that the core regional security interests in Asia are 
the freedom of navigation, regional economic prosperity, and the deterrence of military 
threats against peace.31 The goal is to ensure that the sea-lanes in East Asia are always 
open and safe to facilitate the free flow of commerce that is essential for the United States 
and its allied trade partners such as Japan, and South Korea.32 United States trade with 
Asia constitutes approximately 40 percent of the United States total trade volume.33 In 
2017, Japan and South Korea, respectively, were the United States fourth and sixth-largest 
trading partners in terms of two-way exports.34 The random weapons testing conducted by 
 
28 Matthew Pennington, “Trump Strategy on North Korea: Maximum Pressure and Engagement,” AP 
News, April 14, 2017, https://apnews.com/86626d21ea2b45c79457a873a747c452/Trump-strategy-on-
NKorea:-%27Maximum-pressure-and-engagement%27. 
29 Liegl, “Maximum Pressure—Deferred Engagement,” 368. 
30 Liegl, 368. 
31 Bruce W. Bennett and Booseung Chang, “Strengthening U.S.-ROK Relations in the New 
Administrations of the United States and South Korea,” (Rand Corporation, 2018), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF364.html. 
32 Bennett and Chang, “Strengthening U.S.-ROK Relations in the New Administrations,” 2. 
33 Bennett and Chang, 2. 
34 Schwarzenberg, “U.S. Trade with Major Trading Partners,” 29–31. 
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North Korea coupled with the country’s growing nuclear weapons, and intercontinental 
ballistic missile arsenal threatens the flow of commerce for U.S. allies’ in the region.  
The United States’ bargaining position with North Korea has a direct impact on 
South Korea and Japan. It can prove difficult trying to manage small alliances while 
attempting to negotiate with an adversary country like North Korea.35 The bilateral alliance 
between the United States and Japan extends the American nuclear umbrella to Japan, and 
it also provides Japan security and maneuvering room when dealing with North Korea.36 
Since Japan has a defensive military posture they rely heavily on the bilateral treaty with 
the United States for defense against nuclear weapons. Japan’s limited ability to deter 
threats creates vulnerability and as a result when there are changes in U.S. policy 
concerning North Korea it triggers anxiety in Tokyo about the United States strategic 
commitment to Japan.37 Furthermore, this anxiety motivates Japan to increase its defense 
capabilities in support of its national security interest and prosperity. Japan has made 
progress to strengthen its ballistic missile defense with the Patriot Advanced Capability-3, 
Aegis deployed warships and the planned launching of two Aegis Ashore systems to 
provide additional defense against North Korea.38  
The United States deters the DPRK’s military threats with increased military 
presence in the region and joint exercises with regional allies. However, increasing military 
pressure on the Korean peninsula only further escalates the tensions between North Korea 
and the United States thus complicating allied leader’s efforts to engage the security issues 
regarding the Korean peninsula.39 The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States 
and ROK is a central part of South Korea’s defense policy.40 Since the alliance began there 
 
35 Audrye Wong, “Managing Small Allies Amidst Patron–Adversary Rapprochement: A Tale of Two 
Koreas,” Asian Security, December 10, 2018, 107–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1551883. 
36 Chanlett-Avery et al., “Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress,” 12. 
37 Chanlett-Avery et al., 330. 
38 Monica Montgomery, “Japan Expands Ballistic Missile Defenses,” Arms Control Association, 
September 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-09/news/japan-expands-ballistic-missile-defenses. 
39 Chubb, “A Nuclear North Korea and the Limitations of U.S. Security Perspectives,” 317. 
40 Mats Engman, “U.S.-ROK Military Exercises: Provocation or Possibility?,” Institute for Security & 
Development Policy, March 2018, http://isdp.eu/publication/u-s-rok-military-exercises-provocation-
possibility/. 
9 
have been several large-scale military exercises conducted by the United States and South 
Korea. Militarily to prepare for a North Korean threat the United States and ROK 
participated in Team Spirit, which was conducted as both a carrot and stick during U.S.–
DPRK negotiations.41 Recently, U.S.-ROK military exercises have been postponed for 
political reasons as an act of goodwill to North Korea.42 Even without the combined 
military exercises as a line of defense, South Korea still has the Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense (THAAD) and the Patriot Advanced Capability system to defend themselves 
from North Korea’s missile threats and provocations.43 Additionally, the proximity of 
North Korea’s weapons arsenal could cause extreme damage to Seoul in the event of a 
U.S.–DPRK military conflict, and this reality has dissuaded the United States from 
embracing a more aggressive military strategy in respect to North Korea.44  
3. The China Factor 
Other scholars highlight how the Peoples Republic of China’s (PRC) relationship 
with the DPRK disrupts U.S. policymakers’ efforts at halting North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program.45 The PRC share a similar strategic interest as the United States of 
preventing a nuclear armed North Korea and supports most economic sanctions imposed 
by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).46 However, Beijing is skeptical of 
imposing maximum pressure of increased sanctions on North Korea because of the possible 
economic crisis it may cause within North Korea, which could eventually lead to the 
 
41 Robert Collins, “A Brief History of the US-ROK Combined Military Exercises,” 38 North, 
February 26, 2016, https://www.38north.org/2014/02/rcollins022714/. 
42 Robert Burns, “Joint Exercise with American and South Korean Military Postponed in ‘Act of 
Goodwill’ toward North Korea,” Military Times, November 2019, 
https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2019/11/17/joint-exercise-with-american-and-south-korean-
military-criticized-by-north-korea-postponed-in-act-of-goodwill/. 
43 “THAAD on the Korean Peninsula,” Institute for Security & Development Policy, October 2017, 
http://isdp.eu/publication/korea-thaad/. 
44 Vann H. Van Diepen and Daniel Depetris, “Putting North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles into 
Perspective,” 38 North, September 2019, https://www.38north.org/2019/09/vvandiependdepetris090519/. 
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downfall of the country.47 Such an event could lead to a refugee crisis, which could affect 
the entire region and especially Northeast China.48 
China is North Korea’s largest trading partner accounting for more than 40 percent 
of the DPRK’s trade volume.49 The inequality of this relationship provides China with 
substantial leverage over North Korea.50 Chinese leadership has three critical priorities for 
policy in respect to the DPRK, which have a direct impact on the United States ability to 
resolve the North Korean problem. William Boik states in the Letort papers, that the three 
priorities which affect China is “preventing the United States from dominating a unified 
Korea; being seen in a positive light for playing a major role in the denuclearization of the 
peninsula; and using the situation in North Korea to leverage the United States on other 
key issues of interest to the PRC.”51  
4. The North Korea Factor 
Another strain of scholarship stresses the role of North Korea’s actions in the 
making of U.S. policy. North Korea’s foreign policy strategy encompasses three key 
elements: security, legitimacy, and development.52 To accomplish these goals North Korea 
uses a combination of soft and hardline strategies in relation to the United States—
confrontation and engagement.53 However, history has shown that whenever the United 
States decides to employ the hardline engagement strategy toward the DPRK the retaliation 
often results in a weapons demonstration. During the six-party negotiation process in 2005 
a series of hardline engagement interactions coupled with hardened U.S. financial 
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restrictions led to stalls within the negotiation process, this in turn led to North Korea 
conducting its first nuclear weapons test in 2006.54  
North Korea is considered a “hard target” regarding economic sanctions because 
the country is an authoritarian regime.55 Authoritarian regimes can impose costs on their 
populations, which has made it harder for the United States and the United Nations to 
convince North Korea of nuclear disarmament through the act of sanctions alone.56 
Sanctions can serve a multitude of purposes and there are a variety of ways to pressure a 
country through sanctions, but it requires strict adherence to the policies developed by the 
country imposing the sanctions. The direct economic costs to leadership or the indirect 
economic costs like trade embargos are the two routes of implementing economic 
sanctions.57 
U.S. policy toward North Korea cycles between appeasement, and engagement—
the United States appeases North Korea by offering concessions for denuclearization and 
engages through economic sanctions and increased military posture on the Korean 
peninsula. This occurred during the Leap Day Deal made in 2012—North Korean leader 
Kim Jung-un agreed to a temporary halt of its nuclear weapons program to receive 
economic aid from the United States in return.58 Just a few months after making the Leap 
Day Deal in 2012 North Korea launched two satellites which resulted in the United States 
voiding the Leap Day deal.59 Again in 2017 as tensions rose between the United States and 
North Korea there was a subsequent increase of weapons testing conducted by North 
Korea. Some believe that the weapons tests were two-fold to show how powerful and 
unrelenting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un can be, and to announce to the United States 
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that North Korea was present and had no intentions on halting progress on its nuclear 
weapons development program.60  
Despite efforts by the United States, its allies, the United Nations, and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—North Korea has defied, stymied, and 
deterred repeated efforts at dismantling its nuclear weapons program.61 North Korea is a 
rogue state actor, currently on the threshold of becoming a major nuclear power threat to 
the United States.62 In an attempt to restrain North Korea, President Trump met with Kim 
Jung-un in early 2018 and issued a joint statement saying that the United States will provide 
security to North Korea, and that in return North Korea will work toward denuclearization 
of the Korean peninsula.63 However, as of the writing of this thesis, U.S.–DPRK 
negotiations have stalled and North Korea has continued violating United Nations 
injunctions to halt its weapons testing and development.64  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES  
Hypothesis 1: Changing presidential administrations national security priorities are 
the main driver of U.S. policy in relation to North Korea.  
This hypothesis posits that shifts in U.S. policy concerning North Korea was driven 
primarily by the policy preferences and priorities of the elected presidents of the United 
States. U.S. foreign policy varies based off a variety of factors to include the president that 
is in office, the national interest of the United states, and the nation that the policy applies 
to. Throughout the span of four presidencies, each U.S. president had a different policy 
approach toward denuclearizing North Korea; however, there were common trends. U.S. 
policy in relation to North Korea during the Clinton to Trump administrations bordered 
between an outwardly confrontational posture and the application of appeasement 
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strategies, this led to escalated tensions and inadequate resolutions, which provided 
Pyongyang with the maneuvering room to further develop its nuclear weapons program.65  
Hypothesis 2: The main factor shaping U.S. policy toward the DPRK is the bilateral 
military alliances with South Korea and Japan, which obligates the U.S. to provide them 
with security from North Korea.66  
There is great difficulty trying to manage small alliances while attempting to 
negotiate with an adversary country like North Korea.67 The issues that U.S. policymakers 
face when developing policy toward North Korea is ensuring that U.S. national interest 
does not impede with regional allies’ national interest. The United States, South Korea, 
and Japan seek for full denuclearization of the DPRK, and each country has worked 
collectively through the application of economic sanctions and diplomacy to achieve this 
goal. Although both Japan and South Korea have taken the preliminary steps to add both 
political and economic pressure on the DPRK, each country relies heavily on the United 
States to reach an agreement with North Korea regarding its nuclear weapons program. 
The frequent weapons testing conducted by North Korea and its large nuclear weapons 
arsenal has ignited fear in both South Korea and Japan, which in turn has increased pressure 
on the United States to engage in dialogue with North Korea to ensure ally security.  
Hypothesis 3: The actions of the People’s Republic of China are the major factor 
shaping U.S. policy in respect to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.68  
The PRC shares a similar strategic interest as the United States of denuclearizing 
North Korea.69 China is North Korea’s oldest ally and main provider of imported goods to 
the country. This gives the PRC more leverage over the DPRK economically than the 
United States. However, Beijing has been skeptical of imposing maximum pressure of 
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increased sanctions on North Korea because of the possible crisis it may cause, which could 
lead to a refugee crisis that could affect the entire region and especially Northeast China.70  
Hypothesis 4: The major driver of U.S. policy concerning North Korea is 
Pyongyang’s bellicose, and recalcitrant behavior, which makes it deeply radical and 
dangerous to deal with.71  
There is a well-established cycle in U.S.-DPRK relations: the United States 
provides concessions to North Korea—North Korea agrees to the set terms of a deal and 
then violates the deal—the United States then imposes stricter sanctions on North Korea. 
The United States along with the United Nations Security Council can impose as many 
sanctions as possible on North Korea, but they will eventually decrease in effectiveness  
if the countries that impose them fail to enforce them.72 The United States has attempted 
to halt North Korea’s nuclear weapons program since the Clinton administration with  
no success, in large part due to the DPRK having no interest in following the international 
order.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis analyzed the major drivers of U.S. policy in relation to North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program from the Clinton administration until the present day. In this case 
study, U.S. policy concerning North Korea was the dependent variable and the independent 
variables are presidential administrations foreign policy philosophy, allies’ interests, U.S.-
China relations, and NK actions. This thesis posits four-hypothesis as the possible major 
drivers of U.S. policy toward North Korea and will evaluate each presidency to see which 
hypothesis derived from the literature were present. This overall thesis consists of the 
following four chapters: Chapter I provides an overview of U.S.-DPRK relations; Chapter 
II evaluates U.S. foreign policy concerning North Korea during the Clinton, and Bush 
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administrations; Chapter III examines U.S. foreign policy in relation to North Korea during 
the Obama and Trump administrations; and the final chapter concludes with summary of 
findings and future policy recommendations for the U.S. government.  
This thesis evaluated the following four hypotheses chronologically from the 
Clinton administration to the Trump administration to gain an understanding about the 
drivers of U.S. policy about North Korea. The first hypothesis posits that the main driver 
of U.S. policy toward North Korea is that the policies lack consistency because it changes 
depending on each presidential administration’s national security interests and focus. The 
evidence used to support this hypothesis came from presidential biographies and the state 
department to provide a detailed timeline of accounts regarding DPRK policy during each 
administration. Other sources included each presidential administrations National Security 
Strategy, Congressional Research Reports, and National Defense Strategies to get an 
understanding of each administration’s regional national security interest for North Korea 
during their respective terms. While reviewing the above resources the evidence 
highlighted were the different strategies employed with respect to North Korea to dissuade 
them from developing its nuclear weapons program, and the inconsistencies of these 
strategies during each presidential administration. 
The second hypothesis suggests that the main factor shaping U.S. policy toward the 
DPRK is the bilateral military alliances with South Korea and Japan, which obligates the 
United States to provide them with security from North Korea.73 The evidence utilized to 
support this hypothesis comprised of primary sources from the presidential administration 
and secondary scholarship written during the Clinton–Trump administrations to get an 
understanding of how U.S. national interests aligned with South Korea and Japan’s national 
interests. Other resources that proved valuable were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
ROK, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan to get an understanding of their security 
roles in U.S. policy pertaining to the DPRK. The evidence required from the above 
resources to support this hypothesis came from reviewing how South Korea and Japan’s 
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national security interests factored into U.S. policy in respect to North Korea during the 
Clinton to Trump administrations. 
The third hypothesis postulates that the actions of the PRC, are the major factor 
shaping U.S. policy in relation to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.74 The evidence 
necessary to support this hypothesis derived from secondary scholarship on Sino-U.S. and 
PRC-DPRK relations to see if China has in fact influenced U.S.-DPRK relations and 
hindered U.S. policy with respect to North Korea. An additional resource that will prove 
valuable is the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s publications and press briefings. While 
reviewing the above resources the evidence highlighted the role that China has played 
toward denuclearizing North Korea, including actions that support U.S. policy goals, such 
as sanctions, and the six-party talks, but also actions that stymied the achievement of U.S. 
policy goals, such as trading with North Korea and providing it cover at the United 
Nations.75  
The fourth hypothesis infers that the major driver of U.S. policy concerning North 
Korea is Pyongyang’s bellicose and recalcitrant behavior, which makes them deeply 
radical and dangerous to deal with.76 The evidence required to support this hypothesis was 
secondary scholarship and newspapers on U.S.-DPRK interactions over the span of the 
Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations to get a better understanding of how 
North Korean actions shape U.S. foreign policy. An additional resource included reports 
from the United Nations Security Council and North Korea press releases, which showed 
how North Korea has undermined U.S. policies that aim at nuclear disarmament, and that 
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II. THE CLINTON AND BUSH ERA 
The United States has united with allies under NATO and the United Nations 
Security Council to negotiate with the DPRK regarding its nuclear weapons program. The 
goal of U.S. foreign policy with respect to North Korea has been preventing this rogue state 
actor from developing nuclear weapons and advanced ballistic missile capabilities on the 
Korean peninsula since the end of the Cold War. North Korea like many other countries 
during the Cold War attempted to join the nuclear race by developing a secret nuclear 
weapon program and advancing its ballistic missiles program. Both the Clinton and the 
Bush administration attempted to make it their goal to prevent the DPRK from advancing 
its nuclear weapons program and capabilities from 1992‒2008.  
President Clinton’s first term in office required him to shift from the Bush41 
administration “new world order” to figure out how to properly handle the North Korean 
problem. Between 1990–1992 the Bush administration applied a strategy of appeasement 
toward Pyongyang. The appeasement strategy consisted of offering Pyongyang various 
incentives such as the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in 
return for North Korea’s compliance with inspections from the IAEA.77 This strategy laid 
the foundation for President Clinton’s engagement strategy in relation to North Korea.  
The Clinton administration had the task of rebuilding U.S. relations with the 
international community upon the conclusion of the Cold War. The aftermath of the Cold 
War left many countries’ economies weak leaving them with the task of rebuilding their 
own individual nations. It is important to note that North Korea lost much of its funding 
when the Soviet Union collapsed, and the country had to figure out a way to build a 
relationship with the international community to move forward out of isolation. This 
required the DPRK to build its relationship back up with China, Japan, and South Korea 
while attempting to build a relationship with the United States. Threatening to pull out of 
the NPT was a bargaining chip used to make the country more relevant in the international 
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arena, as none of the countries in the United Nations wanted North Korea to acquire nuclear 
weapons capabilities.  
The engagement strategy consisted of pursuing diplomatic solutions to combat the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean peninsula.78 Though 
diplomacy through the act of engagement was the preferred method, there were several 
courses of action assessed by the Clinton administration from January 1993 and throughout 
the 1994 nuclear crisis. The options explored consisted of the use of diplomacy through 
the process of gradual escalation—potential military airstrikes on known North Korean 
nuclear sites, the placement of economic sanctions by the United Nations Security Council, 
and increased diplomatic and economic pressure from Beijing with support from Seoul and 
Japan. The engagement strategy eventually proved to be effective and resulted in the 1994 
Agreed Framework Deal with North Korea to resolve the issues surrounding proliferation 
on the Korean peninsula.  
Continuing the path of a nuclear free Korean peninsula was an initial goal of the 
George W. Bush administration when he became president in 2001. However, there were 
unforeseen circumstances that quickly diverted the Bush administrations attention away 
from resuming diplomatic relations with North Korea to continue the work of his 
predecessor. The attack on the United States home front that occurred in 2001 plunged both 
United States and the international community into crisis compelling the Bush 
administration to launch the war on terror. The tragedy suffered by the United States made 
room for North Korea to continue its journey of becoming a nuclear state. While the focus 
of the Bush administration and much of the world were on combating terrorism in the 
Middle East, North Korea began its proliferation efforts. 
In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush labelled North Korea an axis 
of evil and shifted his foreign policy toward North Korea from the Clinton administration 
engagement strategy to a hardline and diplomacy strategy. There were always conflicting 
statements made by high levels of leadership within the Bush administration regarding 
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North Korea, and the desired end-result of preventing proliferation on the Korean peninsula 
was never achieved. Through the span of an eight-year term attempts by the United States 
to isolate North Korea by freezing them out in hopes that the regime would topple was an 
oversight on the Bush administration senior leadership. The mix of assertive personality 
types which many critics deemed “hawkish personalities” created inconsistencies in U.S. 
policy concerning North Korea during the Bush presidency. There were times during the 
negotiation process where it seemed as if the United States would achieve its goal of 
complete, verifiable, irreversible, and dismantling (CVID), however the moment 
Washington could see the light at the end of the tunnel, North Korea would find a way to 
stall negotiations.  
During both administrations, attempting to prevent North Korea from developing 
nuclear weapons and trying to coerce the country into complying with IAEA inspections 
of its known nuclear facilities was a high priority concerning American policy regarding 
North Korea. Another commonality present was North Korea’s provocations which were 
directed at U.S. allies to try to force the United States into providing concessions to the 
regime with no real guarantees of halting its nuclear weapons program. Some challenges 
that were present during each administration was China feared the collapse of North 
Korea’s economy through the action of implying harsher economic sanctions. The North 
Korean sympathizers in Japan would provide North Korea with financial aid and this 
proved challenging for the Clinton administration, particularly because it negated the 
effectiveness of the United States unilateral sanctions against North Korea. President Bush 
faced the challenges of developing a cohesive strategy that all countries involved in the 
six-party talks could agree upon. Although South Korea feared the threat a nuclear North 
Korea would impose on its nations border, the country also feared the threat that would 
result from military action by the United States. China and South Korea did not agree with 
the United States strategy of pushing North Korea into isolation through the act of imposing 
harsher economic sanctions.  
20 
A. RISING TENSIONS 
North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, and shortly after joining the NPT North Korea 
agreed to the terms of the 1992 Korean denuclearization declaration.79 The Korean 
declaration consisted of both North Korea and South Korea agreeing not to pursue its 
nuclear ambitions and to follow the stipulations contained within the NPT.80 Although 
North Korea entered into the above proliferation treaties the country never really complied 
with either agreement and was still taking steps to develop a nuclear weapons  
program. The lack of compliance from North Korea, and the announcement of its intentions 
to withdraw from the NPT lead to what would eventually become known as the 1994 
nuclear crisis. 
There is a clause in the NPT that require countries to allow for random inspections 
conducted by the IAEA. North Korea agreed in February 1993 to allow for IAEA 
inspectors to check their known nuclear facilities, however, March 12th, 1993, Pyongyang 
announced its intentions to withdraw from the NPT.81 After announcing its withdrawal 
from the NPT, on March 15th, North Korea blocked the IAEA inspectors from completing 
their required inspections.82 The United States could not allow for North Korea to 
withdraw from the NPT and it was incumbent for the Clinton administration to compel 
North Korea to adhere to the requirements as stipulated by the NPT. The United States 
along with one hundred forty countries immediately issued official statements denouncing 
North Korea’s withdrawal and declared that the North must comply with IAEA 
safeguards.83 The tensions between Washington and Pyongyang hit an all-time high only 
two months into President Clinton’s first term, and the actions taken by North Korea led to 
chaos and confusion as many countries felt their security would be threatened if Pyongyang 
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was not checked appropriately. These fears in turn led to the first nuclear crisis between 
the United States and North Korea and pushed North Korea to the top of President Clinton’s 
foreign policy list.  
The events that occurred during the first year of President Clinton’s term eventually 
led to the 1994 nuclear crisis in which the administration strongly considered war as an 
option of deterrence to thwart North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. There was cause for 
concern over the blocked IAEA inspections from North Korea because the reactor that 
Pyongyang were studying operated on fuel rods, and the remaining fuel could be used to 
produce plutonium to develop nuclear weapons.84 This sparked concern for many 
countries but the United States in particular because of the North’s proximity to allies such 
as South Korea and Japan whom the United States was committed to protecting.  
In March of 1993, as suspicions arose in the international community over North 
Korea’s potential to develop a nuclear weapons program, President Clinton became 
determined to stop the rogue state because of the threat it posed to U.S. national security. 
The thought that this isolated country could potentially develop nuclear weapons and 
possibly sell them to the highest bidder ignited a frenzy amongst even the DPRK’s 
strongest ally—China. The United States began to make preparations for negotiations with 
North Korea in April of 1993—June 1993 the United States and North Korea issued a joint 
statement—Pyongyang would suspend its withdrawal from the NPT, agree to the principles 
of a nuclear free Korean peninsula, and agree to a reunified Korea.85 However, upon 
issuing this joint statement North Korea continued to evade IAEA inspections, which led 
to the United States combined action of coercive and diplomatic approaches and an 
increase in U.S. military forces in South Korea.86  
February of 1994 President Clinton put U.S. military forces on high alert in case 
Washington made the determination that military intervention would be the best course of 
action to deter North Korea. The United States shipped anti-rocket Patriot missiles back to 
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South Korea—the Pentagon began to formulate war plans and the Clinton administration 
considered launching airstrikes to target North Korea’s nuclear facilities.87 Military 
intervention on the United States part would have potentially caused the loss of lives 
upwards to one million people if the DPRK decided to pre-emptively strike South Korea 
in response to the United States actions.88 The back and forth actions between North Korea 
and the United States further increased tensions between the two countries and created 
ambiguity between the United States and South Korea. 
B. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
The Clinton administration decided that going to war with North Korea would not 
be in the best interest of the United States or its ally South Korea. Instead the administration 
decided to move forward with imposing economic sanctions as the means to end the 
nuclear crisis for the reason that the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea agreed 
that a war with North Korea had to be prevented at all cost. There were two options 
available to President Clinton regarding imposing economic sanctions, the Trading with 
the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), or convincing the United Nations Security Council to 
invoke harsher sanctions on North Korea. The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 
authorizes the use of economic sanctions against foreign nations during the time of war or 
during other periods of national emergency and has been employed with respect to North 
Korea since the conclusion of the Korean War in 1953.89  
The nuclear issue with North Korea was a priority foreign relations problem for the 
Clinton administration. The United States imposed full economic sanctions on North Korea 
with the Treasury Department’s Foreign Assets Control Regulations, which was an act 
established in 1950 under TWEA.90 However, the Clinton administration feared that the 
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sanctions imposed under TWEA may not be sufficient enough to coerce North Korea into 
complying with the NPT. North Korean diplomats warned the United States that their 
country would regard sanctions as an act of war.91 The Clinton administration felt the best 
approach for negotiations with North Korea would consist of trilateral talks between the 
United States, Japan, and South Korea. Both Japan and South Korea felt as though 
economic sanctions against North Korea was a measure that should be considered, however 
not at the risk of war. 
Japan favored gradual escalation as the diplomatic approach between the United 
States and North Korea to resolve the conflict. The concerns that Tokyo had were about 
how Pyongyang might react or view economic sanctions when the country was facing dire 
economic challenges that stemmed from its isolation in the international arena. Yohei Kono 
the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan stated that Japan would support economic sanctions 
against North Korea if the efforts would convince North Korea to re-join the NPT.92 
However, Japan preferred for the United States to resolve the issue with diplomacy through 
negotiations with North Korea.  
It was not until 1994 that Japan began to take economic sanctions against North 
Korea more seriously. During this time Japan was North Korea’s second-largest trading 
partner after China.93 In 1994 Japan was dealing with domestic struggles within the 
government making it difficult for the country to be an effective force when dealing with 
North Korea, this resulted in Japan relying on the United States to convince Pyongyang to 
comply with IAEA safeguards. Tokyo had to convince its populace to back the 
governments consideration to impose sanctions on North Korea. This proved difficult 
because of the pro-Pyongyang Koreans living in Japan that were making substantial 
contributions to North Korea in secret within the range of 200 to 600 million dollars per 
year.94 With the formation of the Tsutomu Hata government—the Liberal Democratic 
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Party within Japan, the United States received the support that was needed from a critical 
ally to further push the need for harsher economic sanctions from the United Nations 
Security Council on North Korea.95  
South Korea had a two-step plan in mind to resolve the North Korean conflict 
without the bloodshed that would ensue from war. The plan consisted of Washington 
maintaining a dialogue with North Korea using diplomacy as the first option to resolve the 
conflict.96 The second step consisted of gradual escalation of sanctions to compel North 
Korea to comply with the demands of the United States and suspend its withdrawal from 
the NPT, while allowing for inspections from the IAEA.97 The two-step plan would only 
be attainable through the act of diplomacy from the United States, South Korea, and Japan. 
To execute this, the United States, South Korea, and Japan would have to ensure that each 
country’s interest was aligned. In 1994 South Korea cut off its bilateral trade with North 
Korea to begin the necessary steps of imposing sanctions on North Korea.98  
President Clinton was adamant about repairing the United States relationship with 
China in hopes that Beijing would be the olive branch for U.S.–DPRK relations during the 
nuclear crisis. China’s position remained firmed throughout the nuclear crisis and thought 
the best option to resolve the conflict would come from diplomacy. Considering the 
economic state of North Korea during the early 90s after losing funding from the Soviet 
Union, China did not want to see the collapse of the North Korean regime. China supported 
the concept of gradual escalation and used it to their advantage by threatening to veto any 
Security Council resolutions regarding imposing harsher sanctions against North Korea.99 
Diplomacy was the consensus amongst the international community on the best option to 
an open dialogue between the United States and the DPRK, however eventually the 
dialogue stalled. With little progress made between the U.S.–DPRK negotiations, the 
nuclear crisis beginning to boil over. As the crisis escalated the United States, Japan, and 
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South Korea shared the same consensus along with China and Russia that sanctions may 
be the route to a peaceful solution to the nuclear crisis.100  
C. THE 1994 AGREED FRAMEWORK DEAL 
In June 1994 former President Carter could see that the issue between the United 
States and North Korea required a diplomatic approach to ease the mounting tensions 
surrounding the crisis. President Carter volunteered to go to North Korea in an unofficial 
capacity to meet with Kim Il Sung as a private citizen representing the Carter center and 
not the United States government.101 President Clinton was not convinced that the trip was 
the best solution until Vice President Al Gore encouraged him to approve the mission. 
South Korean President Kim Young Sam felt as though the visit would only encourage 
Pyongyang and make Kim Il Sung feel as though his tactics were working.102  
President Carter sent word back to the White House after four days in North Korea 
stating that he reached a breakthrough with the North Korean leader who was once again 
prepared to allow for IAEA inspections, in return for Washington to recommence direct 
negotiations with Pyongyang.103 The visit made by former President Carter opened the 
gateway for a four-month negotiation process between the United States and North Korea 
which resulted in the 1994 Agreed Framework Deal. As a result of the visit, North Korea 
put a halt on its nuclear weapons program and the United States removed economic 
sanctions from the table during the negotiation process.104  
On October 21, 1994, following the four-month negotiation process the United 
States and North Korea reached a deal known as the 1994 Agreed Framework deal in 
Geneva.105 The deal called for North Korea to freeze its nuclear facilities with the hopes 
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of the eventual termination of known nuclear facilities.106 This was a big step in building 
trust between North Korea and the United States and an even larger step for Kim Jung-Il 
to move his country out of isolation within the international arena. North Korea agreed to 
allow for its facilities to be placed under IAEA inspections and monitoring as well as 
shutting down the 5-megawatt reactor, which the original plutonium had been withdrawn 
from.107 In exchange for their compliance North Korea would receive two light-water 
reactors and 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year during the construction of the 
reactors.108 The Korean peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) would be 
responsible for constructing and financing the two light-water reactors which would take 
approximately ten years to construct.  
It appears that the engagement strategy combined with appeasement employed with 
respect to North Korea by the United States and regional allies contributed directly to the 
outcome of the 1994 Agreed Framework deal. With the help of South Korea and Japan the 
four-billion-dollar price tag of the two-light water reactors would be covered thus aiding 
diplomatic relations not only for U.S.–DPRK relations but ROK–Japan and DPRK 
relations as well. For American taxpayers the price tag of paying this wayward country 
came at a relatively low cost in receipt for safety and a piece of mind that U.S. troops 
stationed in South Korea and Japan would be much safer.109 In the likelihood that North 
Korea decided to break the terms of the Agreed Framework deal the United States and 
allies could reconsider the possibility of applying harsher economic sanctions and would 
save four-billion-dollars in the process. Essentially the Agreed Framework deal was a win-
win situation for the United States, South Korea, Japan, and the international community 
providing a peaceful solution to the 1994 nuclear crisis.  
The 1994 Agreed Framework deal prevented North Korea from building a nuclear 
weapons program, however it did not address DPRK’s missile technology. After the 
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signing of the Framework deal the Central Intelligence Agency reported that in 1995 Iran 
received four Scud transporter-erector-launchers from North Korea.110 Although the 
Clinton administration seemed to resolve the issues regarding North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program, interactions with the wayward country were far from over. Between 
1995‒1999 the United States imposed several sanctions on North Korean companies, and 
North Korea itself for illegal transfers of its missile technology to other rogue nations such 
as Iran. Additionally, to provide safeguards to the United States regarding North Korea, 
Congress passed the North Korea Threat Reduction Act that prevented the United States 
from entering into any international agreements with North Korea that would result in them 
obtaining nuclear materials.111  
D. PRESIDENT BUSH’S POLICY CONCERNING NORTH KOREA   
At the beginning of President Bush’s first term in office he called for an immediate 
review of the 1994 Agreed Framework Deal, a review that lasted the span of six months. 
During the time that the policy was under review the United States stopped all interaction 
with North Korea to determine the best policy option to employ concerning North Korea 
for the new administration. The outcome of the policy review lead to the decision from the 
administration for a comprehensive approach in which North Korea would take the 
necessary steps to repair relations with the United States.112 Shortly after the Bush 
administration reached this conclusion the United States were attacked by terrorists, which 
immediately shifted the administration focus to fighting the war on terrorism. The shift in 
focus by the Bush administration was completely justified, however U.S.–DPRK relations 
became less of a priority for the United States. President Bush labelled “North Korea as an 
axis of evil in his 2002 State of the Union address” and later stated that “he would not 
certify the North’s compliance with all provisions of the Agreed Framework deal.”113 The 
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hardline approach by the Bush administration regarding North Korea led to the second 
nuclear crisis between the United States and DPRK during his first term.  
1. North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Weapons Program
The National Security Strategy published by the Bush administration in September 
of 2002 stated that “the United States will strengthen non-proliferation efforts to prevent 
rogue states from acquiring the materials, and technologies to produce weapons of mass 
destruction.”114 The NSS also spoke about North Korea’s progress pertaining to its 
ballistic missile programs—the successful missile tests conducted while developing its 
own weapons of mass destruction arsenal, and how it is imperative for the United States to 
prevent these rogue states from using advanced weapons against the United States and its 
allies.115 Nevertheless, the main focus of the Bush administration foreign policy decisions 
throughout his first term was on combating terrorism in the Middle East to disband the 
Taliban in Afghanistan and disrupt the activities of Al-Qaeda cells that were operating in 
countries such as Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The focus on terrorism created 
apathy regarding North Korea amongst the senior leadership within the Bush 
administration and this in turn prevented the United States from developing an effective 
strategy in relation to North Korea.  
Following the publishing of the NSS, in October of 2002, U.S. intelligence 
discovered that North Korea were conducting a clandestine uranium enrichment 
program.116 Once this intelligence was received the Bush administration sought to put an 
end to these activities immediately by pushing the country further into isolation. During a 
visit from Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly the regime admitted to the development 
of a second secret nuclear weapons program and stated that the 1994 Agreed Framework 
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deal was nullified.117 Speculation surrounding the details of this interaction between Mr. 
Kelly and the regime were ambiguous, however the evidence presented by the Central 
Intelligence Agency was actionable intelligence which required the United States to  
begin developing a strategy to prevent North Korea from furthering its goal of a nuclear 
weapons program. 
A series of escalatory actions had begun to take place between North Korea and the 
United States between 2001‒2004. On October 25th, 2002, North Korea were prepared to 
re-open dialogue with the United States provided that the United States assured the country 
of nonaggression during the negotiation process.118 However, the Bush administration was 
not interested in opening a dialogue with North Korea until the country completely ceased 
the processing of uranium for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons. The United 
States refusal to appease the North Korean regime through open dialogue resulted in the 
DPRK reopening its Yongbyon nuclear facility followed by the ejection of the IAEA 
inspectors from their country.119 This action from North Korea resulted in the United 
States threatening to impose economic sanctions on North Korea to coerce the regime into 
complying with the existing proliferation treaties. North Korea later announced its 
intentions to withdraw from the NPT in January of 2003, which led to the second nuclear 
crisis on the Korean peninsula.120  
2. Hardline and Diplomacy  
The first few years of President Bush’s term he approached the North Korean 
problem with hardline and diplomacy. The hardline position was to engage the problem 
with increased sanctions as a coercive measure to compel Pyongyang to stop the re-
processing of highly enriched uranium for the purposes of developing nuclear capabilities. 
Nuclear diplomacy was only an option if North Korea would agree to uphold all existing 
proliferation treaties and completely cease the process of excess uranium or plutonium 
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production. However, most of the leadership within the Bush administration had hawkish 
personalities and stood, ready to use military force or power to achieve their agenda or 
policy outcome.121 This personality approach during the Bush administration contributed 
to the tensions that were present within U.S.–DPRK relations and as a resulting factor 
North Korea continued defying the international order.  
3. Economic Sanctions 
Throughout the course of the Bush administration there were several sanctions 
placed on North Korean companies for the illegal transfer of missile materials to other 
rogue states such as Iran and Iraq. The United States placed sanctions on the Changgwang 
Sinyong Corporation in 2001 for violating the Iran Non-proliferation Act of 2000.122 This 
was the second time sanctions were imposed on the company for violating the Iran Non-
proliferation Act of 2000. Imposing sanctions on the corporation for violating the Iran Non-
proliferation Act proved ineffective because the United States can only impose sanctions 
that last for a duration of two years. In August 2002, the United States was compelled to 
impose additional sanctions on the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation as well as the North 
Korean government for transferring missile technology to Yemen.123 Placing sanctions on 
the North Korean government and its corporations did not prevent them from continuing 
the transfer or receipt of missile materials and technology to or from other rogue nations.  
E. THE SIX-PARTY TALKS 
North Korea wanted to engage in bilateral talks with the Bush administration as 
they had done in the past with the Clinton administration when reaching the 1994 Agreed 
Framework deal. However, because of the provocations from the North Korean regime and 
the drastic measures it had taken of unfreezing their nuclear facilities, withdraw from the 
NPT, and the processing of uranium, the Bush administration felt as though multilateral 
talks would be the best course of action. The Chinese government urged the United States 
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and DPRK to begin talks, which were to take place in Beijing in April 2003. However, in 
April prior to the trilateral discussion between the United States, DPRK, and China the 
North Korean Foreign Ministry revealed that North Korea had reprocessed more than 8,000 
spent fuel rods.124 This revelation was a setback to the international community because 
the spent fuel rods could be used to extract plutonium which is used to create nuclear 
weapons. The United States along with cooperation from other countries increased the 
pressure on North Korea to compel them into multilateral talks with the United States, 
North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. These talks would eventually become 
known as the six-party talks for non-proliferation on the Korean peninsula, with the first 
round taking place in August of 2003.  
The United States thought the best way to achieve the goal of non-proliferation 
regarding North Korea would be through regime change by forcing the country into further 
isolation. During an interview by President Bush in late 2002 he stated that toppling the 
regime would be the preferred course of action.125 The goal of the Bush administration 
was CVID of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program through the process of isolation. Later 
Secretary Powell stated that a military course of action to achieve the desired results of 
non-proliferation on the peninsula was still an option and that the United States could not 
reward North Korea’s wayward behavior.126 However, the consequences of military action 
on the United States part would have been catastrophic for allies in the region and troops 
stationed in Japan and South Korea. After President Bush’s statement, North Korea feared 
that the United States would turn its aggression on the country to topple the regime and 
wanted to avoid the actions that occurred in Iraq by all costs and were adamant that the 
United States enter negotiations with a nonaggression promise.  
China, always fearful of the potential consequences of a regime collapse in North 
Korea, continued to favor a diplomatic and gradual approach. Therefore, the route that 
China preferred to pursue was to decrease pressure by offering economic concessions to 
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North Korea and providing the regime with a security guarantee from the United States.127 
China’s interest regarding North Korea consisted on a strategy of deep engagement in a 
market-oriented direction to strengthen North Korea’s economy by increasing trade with 
the North to build the country.128  
South Korea wanted to initiate a step-by-step process with North Korea to resolve 
the issue of proliferation on the peninsula. President Kim Dae-jung created a Sunshine 
policy to employ with respect to North Korea which consisted of three principles: peaceful 
solutions on the Korean peninsula, no attempts of a unified Korea, and improved inter-
Korean relations.129 This policy conflicted with the Bush administration hardline and 
diplomacy strategy regarding North Korea and created conflicting interest between the two 
ally’s policy approach. The principles of the Sunshine policy went against the isolation 
approach that the United States administration was pushing for during the six-party talks 
and Kim Dae-jung expressed that the ROK would rather deal with a nuclear North Korea 
than a collapsed North Korea.130  
Nevertheless, during the six-party talks Japan sided with the United States strategy 
while China and South Korea disagreed with the United States strategy of isolation. In the 
first round of talks, the United States entered negotiations with a long list of demands for 
North Korea but did not provide any concessions as an incentive to urge North Korea to 
meet the demands. The conflicting interests between the participants of the six-party talks 
made it difficult to achieve the desired results of a nuclear free peninsula. In 2004, during 
the six-party talks Pakistan admitted to transferring nuclear technology to North Korea and 
Iran, and as a result the six party talks postponed after only three rounds of negotiations.131 
The six-party talks recommenced in 2005 with approximately one year of nonactivity 
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regarding convincing North Korea to abandon its goal of nuclear weapons development. 
There were a series of incidents that occurred during the timeframe leading up to the 
recommencement of the six-party talks to include the series of missile tests conducted by 
North Korea.132  
The fourth round of talks occurred in July of 2005, followed by a fifth round of 
talks in September 2005 in which an official statement was made by both the United States 
and North Korea. North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in return 
for security guarantees and economic assistance from the United States.133 To provide 
more context, the joint statement announced that North Korea would essentially abandon 
all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, return to the NPT and enforce IAEA 
safeguards, and in return the United States agreed not to invade North Korea, while the 
remaining participants agreed to the recommencement of the light water reactors promised 
during the Agreed Framework deal.134  
Problems soon arose with the official statement once the United States had begun 
to target North Korea’s illicit economic activities. October 21, 2005, the U.S. treasury 
department announced the decision to place sanctions on eight North Korean entities for 
their involvement in the illegal transfer and the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, 
biological weapons, and related delivery vehicles.135 This action by the U.S. government 
led to North Korea walking away from the six-party talks and voiding the joint statement 
made in September. North Korea wanted the United States to lift the sanctions that the 
Treasury Department placed on the eight entities, however the United States refused to lift 
the sanctions because the activities were deemed unlawful. The result of this confrontation 
was North Korea conducting its first nuclear weapons test in October of 2006.136 Although, 
the test was unsuccessful it grasped the attention of the UN Security Council which resulted 
in the implementation of Resolution 1718.  
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United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718 called for several 
requirements from North Korea to include refraining from further nuclear tests, re-joining 
the NPT, suspending all ballistic missile testing, CVID, and immediate return to the six-
party talks.137 To convince North Korea to enforce the above provisions there were 
sanctions applied with the purpose of preventing the DPRK from having the ability to 
further the advancement of its weapons program. As part of this resolution member states 
of the UN Security Council were prohibited from aiding North Korea in its pursuit of 
acquiring illegal weaponry materials.”138  
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 was the only UNSCR adopted 
and enforced on North Korea during the Bush presidency. Many of the sanctions applied 
by the United States regarding North Korea were bilateral sanctions imposed on 
corporations for the illegal sale and transfers of missile technology to other rogue nations. 
There were also sanctions applied on the North Korean government for illicit activities 
pertaining to the transfer, sale, and receipt of illegal missile technologies. In many 
instances, whenever the U.S. government-imposed sanctions on North Korean entities or 
the government it only escalated North Korea’s actions further. The back and forth 
provocations by both North Korea and the United States only exacerbated the negotiation 
process during the six-party talks.  
In 2008, the six-party talks were still in progress however North Korea was still 
participating in the act of separating plutonium. On June 26, 2008, North Korea revealed 
to China—the chairman of the six party talks that they have separated a total of 30 
kilograms of plutonium, of which 2 kilograms was used to conduct its 2006 nuclear test.139 
It became abundantly clear to the Bush administration that despite the ongoing negotiation 
process North Korea could not be trusted. Therefore, on June 26, 2008, President Bush 
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signed Executive Order 13466 to further deal with the persistent threat on the Korean 
peninsula. The following is an excerpt from the Executive Order that was signed: 
I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, find that 
the current existence and risk of the proliferation of weapons-usable fissile 
material on the Korean peninsula constitute an unusual and extraordinary 
threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, and I 
hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat. I further find 
that, as we deal with that threat through multilateral diplomacy, it is 
necessary to continue certain restrictions with respect to North Korea that 
would otherwise be lifted pursuant to a forthcoming proclamation that will 
terminate the exercise of authorities under the Trading With the Enemy Act 
(50 U.S.C. App. 1 et seq.) (TWEA) with respect to North Korea.140 
This statement made it clear that North Korea remained a threat to the United 
States’ national security interests despite the progress that the six-party talks were 
attempting to make to denuclearize the peninsula. It also manifested the realization that 
despite the negotiation process the Bush administration had come to realize that North 
Korea was not serious about negotiations and it was a necessary precaution to maintain 
certain restrictions regarding the regime.  
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter review of American policy concerning North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
development from 1992–2008, shows that for each presidency evaluated there were 
multiple drivers of U.S. policy. During President Clinton’s term in office from 1992–2000 
one of the main drivers for developing policy in relation to North Korea was China’s 
influence over North Korea which made it difficult to effectively impose harsher sanctions. 
An additional driver was the bilateral military alliances with Japan and South Korea and 
convincing them to support the application of harsher economic sanctions. Although both 
Japan and South Korea agreed that economic sanctions would be the preferred route, each 
did not want the risk of starting a war with North Korea. The last driver was North Korea 
consistently declining to comply with IAEA safeguards and this in turn drove the United 
States to lean harder on Pyongyang. 
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The main drivers which influenced the Bush administration policy in relation to 
North Korea during 2000‒2008 were the lack of consistency between the Clinton and Bush 
administration policy concerning North Korea. The drastic switch from the engagement 
strategy to the hardline strategy lacked diplomacy options and instead met the North 
Korean problem with increased sanctions and coercive measures. North Korea’s belligerent 
posture to the international arena throughout the negotiation process also made it difficult 
to affect the desired outcome of a nuclear free Korean peninsula. The bilateral military 
alliances with Japan and South Korea obligate the United States to provide security to these 
allies. North Korea’s threatening posture to Japan and South Korea is what drove the 
United States to consider military action as an option. China preferred bilateral negotiations 
between Washington and Pyongyang over imposing harsher economic sanctions, which 
made it difficult for the United States to employ harsher UNSCR restrictions.  
There were also common trends that transpired during both the Clinton and Bush 
administration regarding American policy concerning North Korea. During both 
administrations China opposed the imposition of harsher economic sanctions on North 
Korea for fear that it may collapse the regime, and for fear of the impact it would have on 
China’s economy. This driver although present during both administrations, weighed more 
heavily during the Bush administration because an element of the hardline strategy required 
imposing harsher economic sanctions to further isolate North Korea from the international 
community. Another trend was North Korea’s disinterest to follow the international order 
and adhere to the restrictions imposed on the country through economic sanctions. This 
driver was of equal weight for both administrations because it required the administrations 
to shift U.S. policy approach to counter North Korea’s behavior. Throughout both 
administrations, Pyongyang continued its provocations with respect to the United States 
allies to try to force the United States into providing concessions to the regime with no real 
guarantees of halting its nuclear weapons program. 
Chapter III will examine the main drivers of U.S. foreign policy in relation to North 
Korea from 2008 until the present. It will present a chronological overview of U.S. policy 
and actions that were taking regarding North Korea while analyzing the outcome and 
effectiveness of policy choices during President Obama and President Trump’s terms in 
37 
office. The four drivers of U.S. policy explored comprise of inconsistent policy choices 
implemented during each presidential administration, China’s influence over North Korea, 
the bilateral military alliances with South Korea and Japan, and North Korea’s belligerent 
posture to the international order. While reviewing the four potential drivers of U.S. policy 
in relation to denuclearizing North Korea during this timeframe, the goal will be to 
determine which, if not all, of the four had explanatory power over effecting U.S. policy 







THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
39 
III. THE OBAMA AND TRUMP ADMINISTRATIONS
Nuclear weapons and ballistic missile testing conducted by North Korea increased 
rapidly from 2008 until the present—resulting in 7 nuclear tests and several ballistic missile 
test conducted during this timeframe.141 There were two attacks carried out in 2010 by 
North Korea on South Korea—one on the South Korean Cheonan that claimed the lives of 
46 sailors, and the second on an artillery barrage against South Korean Marines that killed 
four and left many others wounded.142 In 2017, North Korea launched a series of inter-
continental ballistic missile tests which indicated ranges that could reach the United 
States.143 North Korea conducted several short-range and long-range ballistic missile tests 
in the beginning of President Trumps term, as well as its sixth nuclear weapons test in 
response to President Trumps’ maximum pressure strategy regarding North Korea.144 
From 2008 until the present North Korea’s nuclear weapons program evolved rapidly and 
currently remains a problem to U.S. national security interests’ in East Asia. 
Similar to the Bush administration, the focus of the Obama administration foreign 
policy in relation to North Korea was non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.145 However, 
in 2008, the Obama administration shifted from President Bush’s hardline and diplomacy 
strategy regarding North Korea to a strategy of strategic patience.146 Strategic patience 
consisted of the application of gradually escalating nonviolent means of coercion, mainly 
by implementing sanctions to convince the North Korean leader to come to the negotiation 
table.147 The strategic patience policy was applied on North Korea with a diplomatic 
approach in the beginning of President Obama’s first term. However, following the North 
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Korean attacks on South Korea in 2010, the administration applied strategic patience in a 
confrontational manner through increased military exercises and harsher economic 
sanctions. In 2011, the Obama administration policy for North Korea reverted to diplomacy 
after former President Carter made a humanitarian visit to Pyongyang. This unofficial visit 
led to bilateral talks between Washington and Pyongyang and resulted in the 2012 Leap 
Day Deal. China challenged the United States ability to effectively impose harsh sanctions, 
by bargaining with the United States to decrease the security measures in the UNSCR’s 
that were adopted toward North Korea to better serve the country’s own national 
interest.148 
North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons testing continued to threaten 
regional stability for U.S. security interest in East Asia during the early stages of President 
Trump’s term in office. President Trump shifted from President Obama’s strategic patience 
to a strategy of maximum pressure regarding policy directed at North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program. The strategy of maximum pressure that the Trump administration 
adopted with reference to North Korea consists of increasing diplomatic, economic, and 
military pressure against North Korea.149 There have been challenges during President 
Trump’s term thus far to include the increased weapons testing conducted by North Korea 
throughout 2017, which almost led to a war between the United States and DPRK. 
Additionally, the multiple hostile tweets and official statements made by President Trump 
that were directed at Kim Jung-un led to heightened hostility between Washington and 
Pyongyang in the beginning stages of his presidency. There were also challenges presented 
by the increased threats to Japan and South Korea that have been posed by North Korea’s 
increased weapons testing.  
A. OBAMA’S PRAGUE PLEDGE 
During President Obama’s campaign for U.S. presidency he made his stance on 
nuclear weapons very clear with the belief that nuclear weapons were inhumane military 
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devices that were a result of “Cold War thinking.”150 His main goal was to reduce the 
United States Cold War nuclear weapons arsenal and promote the NPT to further the goal 
of nuclear non-proliferation. He outlined the damage that could be done by nuclear powers 
and the ramifications of what could happen if nuclear weapons fell into the hands of rogue 
states or terrorist organizations. President Obama felt that the United States was a great 
power that had to lead by example, but it would take the entire international community to 
enforce non-proliferation.  
President Obama’s Prague pledge speech was delivered on April 5, 2009, just hours 
after North Korea broke international law by testing a rocket that could be used for long-
range missiles.151 President Obama addressed the weapon test by North Korea during his 
speech stating that “rules must be binding—violations must be punished, and words must 
mean something.”152 This was a call to the international community to stand up and 
address the North Korean problem as a united front, while reiterating that these 
provocations are not just a United States problem but an international problem. President 
Obama also stated that “North Korea needed to understand that the path to security and 
respect would not come from illegal acts of intimidation.”153 The key issues addressed in 
the Prague speech, as they pertain to nuclear non-proliferation became the basis for the 
Obama administration policy of strategic patience concerning North Korea. The UN 
Security Council responded to the illegal rocket launch conducted by North Korea by 
placing stricter punitive measures on North Korea as an extension of UNSCR 1718.154 
Following the expansion of security measures incorporated by the UNSC, North Korea 
pulled out of the six-party talks. As North Korea continued its wayward path of defying 
international order and disregarding Security Council resolutions by participating in the 
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illegal acquiring of nuclear materials, the United States continued its course of 
implementing coercive measures.  
B. ENGAGEMENT THROUGH DIPLOMACY 
President Obama’s strategic patience strategy had similarities to President Bush’s 
hardline diplomacy strategy employed in relation to North Korea because both strategies 
relied on imposing harsher economic sanctions to push North Korea further into 
international isolation. President Bush and President Obama issued several statements of 
non-hostility to North Korea throughout their presidential terms. However, their efforts of 
diplomacy regarding North Korea consisted of disengagement through economic 
sanctions. The difference that existed between President Bush’s hardline strategy and 
President Obama’s strategic patience policy regarding North Korea is the timeframe that 
the policies were applied with relation to North Korea’s weapons development phase. 
During President Bush’s term in office the North was trying to build a nuclear weapon 
program, whereas during President Obama’s term in office the North had successfully 
developed nuclear weapons, and its nuclear weapons program has continued to grow 
rapidly.  
North Korea’s provocations in 2009 plunged the world into an international crisis, 
as the illicit activities by the rogue state continued to increase hostilities amongst U.S. 
regional allies. President Obama issued several official statements assuring the United 
States non-aggression with reference to North Korea in early 2009 even after the DPRK 
conducted its second nuclear weapons test in an act of defiance to the international order. 
In May of 2009, North Korea conducted its second nuclear weapons test, which was a clear 
indication to the United States and the countries within the UNSC that North Korea was 
determined to become a nuclear state. UNSCR 1874 was adopted on June 12, 2009, in 
response to the nuclear test conducted by North Korea and increased the security measures 
of imports/exports of arms to/from the DPRK.155 On June 16, 2009, in a joint press release 
between the United States and ROK, President Obama stated the following: 
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So, I want to be clear that there is another path available to North Korea—a 
path that leads to peace and economic opportunity for the people of North 
Korea, including full integration into the community of nations. That 
destination can only be reached through peaceful negotiations that achieve 
the full and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.156 
 
President Obama’s remarks of non-hostility regarding North Korea despite its many 
attempts to test his ability as President of the United States is a demonstration of the intent 
behind his strategic patience policy. However, the above statement regardless of the 
intentions behind it, fell on deaf ears as North Korea continued to escalate its behavior. 
Increased pressure placed on North Korea through the application of strategic 
patience—diplomacy and coercion—was met by Pyongyang’s authoritarian regime 
increasing tensions and an overarching determination to continually defy the international 
order. Pyongyang continued with their mission of separating plutonium for the purpose of 
developing nuclear weapons and continued its act of intimidating U.S. regional allies’ with 
their many weapons test and military demonstrations. In early 2010, it had become 
abundantly clear that engagement through diplomacy was not a viable option to deal with 
the North Korean problem, despite the many attempts made by Washington to engage with 
Pyongyang through bilateral talks. The Obama administration attempt of diplomacy with 
reference to North Korea consisted of imposing sanctions to coerce the regime into 
continuing the six-party talks, while engaging with China, South Korea, and Japan to 
encourage them to pursue a diplomatic approach as well. The relationship between the 
United States and North Korea during this time consisted of the back and forth actions of 
increased pressure through sanctions by the United States and further provocations by 
North Korea.  
There were two attacks carried out in 2010 by North Korea on South Korea, which 
almost led to a declaration of war on the DPRK from the ROK. The first attack was a 
torpedo that was fired from a North Korean submarine on the South Korean Cheonan that 
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claimed the lives of 46 sailors.157 The second attack from North Korea was an artillery 
barrage against South Korean Marines that killed four and left many others wounded.158 
These heinous acts of violence infuriated South Korea, and almost led to a second Korean 
War. The United States intervened and convinced South Korea to conduct a multi-national 
investigation to ensure that they correctly identify the culprit behind the attack before 
starting a war that would involve the United States.  
The length of time required to accurately investigate the first attack carried out by 
North Korea on South Korea aided the United States in preventing a war on the peninsula 
and precluded South Korea from retaliating on North Korea, because too much time had 
passed. However, when North Korea launched its second attack on South Korea, President 
Lee was determined to strike back at North Korea. South Korea immediately scrambled 
fighter aircraft to target North Korean artillery positions in response to the attack on 
Yeonpyeong-do.159 It had become readily apparent to the Obama administration that 
preventing South Korea from starting a war with the North would become a necessary task 
and priority for U.S. policymakers.  
The two acts of aggression on North Korea’s part on South Korea in 2010 redirected 
U.S. policy concerning North Korea in a more confrontational direction, which strained 
bilateral negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang.160 There were disagreements 
between the United States and South Korea in determining a way forward to decrease 
hostilities with North Korea. Although, the United States and South Korean policy in 
respect to North Korea had some inconsistencies, the Obama administration showed their 
support to South Korea by increasing military exercises in the region. In February of 2011, 
in response to joint U.S.–ROK military exercises North Korea threatened to turn Seoul into 
a “sea of fire.”161 
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C. ENGAGEMENT THROUGH STRATEGIC PATIENCE 
The acts of hostility by South Korean President Lee became a key driver of U.S. 
policy with reference to North Korea in 2010. To uphold the U.S.–ROK alliance and 
reassure South Korea of the extended nuclear umbrella as delineated in the Mutual Defense 
Treaty the Obama administration had to revise their policy approach of engagement in 
relation to North Korea. The price that came from preventing South Korea from dragging 
the United States into an unwanted war was shifting from the diplomacy aspect of strategic 
patience to a more hardline confrontational strategy by increasing economic sanctions and 
U.S. military presence in the region.162 This shift in policy direction by President Obama 
threatened the bilateral talks that were occurring between Washington and Pyongyang 
because they were perceived as an act of hostility by the DPRK.  
The Obama administration policy of strategic patience hinged on the utilization of 
economic sanctions, diplomacy, military presence, and UN Security Council resolutions to 
engage the issues of proliferation on the Korean peninsula. On April 18, 2011, President 
Obama implemented Executive Order 13570 to prohibit certain transactions regarding 
North Korea, further expanding the national emergency declared on North Korea, to ensure 
that UNSCRs were being enforced to the upmost extent.163 Following the signing of the 
new executive order, on April 2011, China proposed a three-step plan to decrease ROK–
DPRK hostilities and continue the path of denuclearization on the peninsula. This three-
step plan consisted of beginning bilateral talks between North Korea and South Korea—
bilateral talks between North Korea and the United States, followed by resuming the six-
party talks.164 The Obama administration made it clear that inter-Korean dialogue with the 
goal of satisfying South Korea would be the first crucial step to recommencing six-party 
talks.165   
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1. The Leap Day Deal 
The United States returned to diplomacy in 2011 when former President Jimmy 
Carter joined by ambassador Robert King visited Pyongyang to discuss human rights issues 
with North Korea.166 Bilateral talks between the United States and DPRK which were 
coined as “high level talks,” eventually led to the “food for freeze” agreement that was later 
named the 2012 Leap Day Deal.167 The initial negotiations that led to the food for freeze 
were conducted between Kim Jung-il and the Obama administration, however in December 
2011 Kim Jung-il passed away and was succeeded by his son Kim Jung-un.168 The regime 
change that occurred in North Korea left U.S. policymakers unsure of whether the “food 
for freeze” would be upheld by Pyongyang.  
Bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea proved successful after 
the round of meetings that took place in Beijing between February 23‒24, which resulted 
in the Leap Day Deal of 2012.169 Kim Jung-un continued the bilateral talks with the United 
States, and on February 29, 2012, released parallel statements with the United States 
regarding the outcome of the high level talks.170 The terms of the Leap Day Deal consisted 
of the United States providing humanitarian assistance and making a non-aggression 
pledge to North Korea, while North Korea agreed to reaffirm its commitment of the 2005 
Joint Statement and refrain from weapons testing or reprocessing plutonium at its nuclear 
facilities.171 It appears that the diplomatic approach of engaging with North Korea through 
bilateral talks had been successful in building a road to reconvening the six-party talks.  
2. End of Talks: Collapse of the 2012 Leap Day Deal 
The parallel statements released by the United States and North Korea that led to 
the 2012 Leap Day Deal had conflicting remarks that would eventually lead to the collapse 
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of the deal just months later. North Korea and the United States could not reach an 
agreement on whether satellite launches would be considered a missile test under the 
stipulations of the agreement. U.S. officials said that satellite vehicle launches (SVLs) were 
considered missile tests under the agreement and later stated that they made this clause 
abundantly clear to the North Korea Foreign Ministry.172 During Kim Jung-il’s time as 
North Korea’s leader, while bilateral talks were occurring, the DPRK pre-scheduled a 
satellite launch in honor of Kim Il Sung’s 100th birthday celebration between April 12‒16th 
of 2012.173 North Korea never acknowledged the provisions of the Leap Day Deal that 
precluded SVLs from being conducted publicly, which essentially meant that the provision 
was never officially recognized.174 Therefore, Kim Jung-un the successor of Kim Jung-il 
decided to move forward with the pre-scheduled launches regardless of the costs. On 
March 16, 2012, Pyongyang announced their intentions to launch the SVL in honor of the 
100th birthday celebration of Kim Il Sung’s, and this announcement came at the expense of 
the Leap Day Deal.175  
April 13, 2012, the White House made an official statement that the United States 
would no longer be honoring the shipment of 240,000 tons of food aid to the impoverished 
nation as stipulated in the Leap Day Deal.176 President Obama issued a statement in 
support of suspending humanitarian aid to the country as follows:  
They make all these investments, tens of millions of dollars, in rockets that 
don’t work at a time when their people are starving, literally, and so what we 
intend to do is work with the international community to further isolate North 
Korea—obviously any opportunity for us to provide them food aid was 
contingent on them abiding by international rules and international norms. 
So, we will continue to keep the pressure on them, and they will continue to 
isolate themselves until they take a different path.177 
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Eventually, talks stalled in 2012 with presidential elections occurring in both the 
United States and South Korea, strategic patience led to inactivity concerning actively 
engaging with North Korea through diplomacy. The remainder of 2012 U.S. policy 
concerning North Korea consisted of a dual-track approach of using both sanctions and 
coercive measures within the realm of the strategic patience policy.178  
D. RISING NUCLEAR STATE 
With the goal of becoming a nuclear power state, North Korea continued its pursuit 
of developing nuclear power technologies. The looming threat that nuclear weapons posed 
to allies within the East Asia region eventually became a very possible threat to the United 
States homeland as North Korea was furthering its missile technology to develop second 
strike nuclear capabilities. Along with developing second strike capabilities, Pyongyang 
were also developing miniaturized warheads that could deliver nuclear charges via ballistic 
missiles with the goal of extending its weapons delivery range to reach the United States. 
Though many of the weapons test conducted by the DPRK were deemed unsuccessful, 
with each failed missile test came the opportunity to refine their missile technology and the 
pace of their weapons program grew exponentially.  
North Korea began their quest of developing the KN-08 in 2011—a ballistic missile 
that was capable of using a solid-fuel propeller and later held a military parade in 2012 to 
unveil a model of the KN-08.179 The KN-08 if successfully developed would present itself 
as one of North Korea’s most successful developments, as it would provide the country 
with second nuclear strike capabilities. The advanced technological improvements with the 
KN-08 combined with Pyongyang’s advances pertaining to short-range and long-range 
ballistic missiles created an imbalance on the peninsula. In a meeting between President 
Obama and Xi Jinping, President Obama expressed his concerns with Pyongyang’s 
progress regarding the development of these newfound technologies stating that “North 
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Korea’s weapons program was a threat to the United States like Taiwan was a threat to 
China”.180 
1. China’s Position 
North Korea’s insistence on defying the international order through the act of 
continuing the path of nuclear weapon testing and development created a frenzy amongst 
the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China. Pyongyang conducted both an SVL test 
and its second nuclear weapons test only one month apart between December 2012 and 
February 2013.181 Various media outlets in China condemned the provocative acts by 
North Korea and insisted that the upper leadership of the administration correct the 
wayward actions of North Korea. China as North Korea’s longest ally and largest trading 
partner was criticized by their citizens for its failure to tame the rogue state. President Xi 
Jinping made a vague statement about North Korea’s provocative activities indicating that 
China did not agree with the actions of Kim Jung-un. 
In the past, China had done their best to protect North Korea from falling further 
into international isolation by preventing the UNSC from imposing harsher sanctions in 
fear that it may lead to a collapse of the DPRK’s economy. However, with the escalating 
actions that transpired after the third nuclear weapons test by North Korea, China showed 
its support to the UNSC by agreeing to all the terms posed in UNSCR 2094, and took the 
necessary steps at implementing all measures within the resolution.182 UN Security 
Council Resolution 2094 implemented measures which targeted North Korean entities, and 
applied secondary sanctions on any country that aided North Korea during its nuclear 
weapons pursuit.183 Any violation by North Korea of the UNSCR’s that were implemented 
deteriorated Sino–DPRK relations compelling China to take additional measures to enforce 
the stipulations within the UNSCR’s.  
 
180 Jackson, 71. 
181 Jackson, 72–73. 
182 Cheng, “North Korea’s Third Nuclear Test and Its Impact on Sino-North Korean Relations,” 39. 
183 Heintz, Shurkin, and Mallory, DPRK Sanctions: Countering DPRK Proliferation Activities, 13. 
50 
2. A Declining U.S. Policy: Strategic Patience on its Final Stretch 
China declared a “red-line” regarding North Korea in 2014, but this declaration did 
nothing at halting the rogue regime from its pursuit of furthering the advancement of its 
nuclear program.184 Once the United States pursued a more confrontational policy of 
strategic patience regarding North Korea by imposing harsher economic sanctions with the 
goal of further isolating the country, North Korea’s provocations continued to ramp up. In 
2015 and 2016, President Obama issued two additional Executive Orders declaring a 
national emergency toward North Korea’s weapons program bringing the total number of 
Executive Orders signed during his terms up to four.185  
As progress of non-proliferation on the Korean peninsula began to stall, there were 
Obama administration officials like Kurt Campbell—an Assistant Secretary of State and 
architect of Asia strategy that acknowledged strategic patience was not producing the 
desired results.186 The amount of UNSCR’s, bilateral economic sanctions, and Executive 
Orders placed on North Korea nearly doubled during President Obama’s terms in office 
with little effect at halting North Korea’s weapons program. In 2015, President Obama 
stated, “there aren’t that many sanctions left—Our capacity to effect changes in North 
Korea is somewhat limited.”187 For the remainder of the Obama administration North 
Korea continued its ballistic and nuclear weapons testing regardless of the amount of 
sanctions imposed on the country, and these provocations carried over into the Trump 
administration with tensions reaching a record high during President Trump’s first year in 
office.  
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E. MAXIMUM PRESSURE: THE TRUMP ERA 
When President Trump assumed the office of presidency in 2017, he inherited a 
nuclear North Korea as a result of decades of ineffective U.S. policies employed 
concerning the North’s nuclear weapons program. From President Clinton’s engagement 
policy to President Bush’s hardline and diplomacy to President Obama’s strategic patience 
policy, there were times when it appeared that the strategies were effective; however, the 
United States did not achieve its goal of a denuclearized Korean peninsula. President 
Trump wanted to take a different approach with U.S. policy in relation to North Korea 
therefore, his administration adopted a foreign policy of maximum pressure regarding 
North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program. This new strategy consists of the 
following four elements: encouraging Beijing to apply pressure on the DPRK, increasing 
economic and financial sanctions, hardening Washington’s bargaining position, and a 
build-up of military threat posture against Pyongyang.188 Through the application of these 
four elements the goal is to maximize pressure on the DPRK to force them into a perilous 
situation, economically and militarily, while engaging with the country on a diplomatic 
front through summit meetings.  
Increased pressure from the United States led to increased tensions between the 
United States and North Korea which reached a record high during 2017, and the United 
States found itself yet again on the brink of war with the rogue state. In January 2017, 
President Trump responded to a threat from North Korea that it would be deploying an 
ICBM declaring “it won’t happen.”189 However, in February 2017 North Korea tested a 
new ballistic missile—the Pukguksong-2, that flew approximately 500 kilometers.190 It is 
not uncommon for North Korea to welcome the new United States President into office by 
conducting a weapons test as a way to determine how the administration will respond to 
these provocations. The significant difference for President Trump is the fact that North 
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Korea possess a nuclear arsenal, which is a major difference than his predecessor faced in 
the early stages of his administration. 
1. On the Brink 
The events that transpired between the United States and North Korea were less 
diplomatic and more confrontational than any of the former U.S. administrations 
combined. In the past, the United States faced the possibility of war with North Korea 
during the 1994 nuclear crisis that occurred during President Clinton’s administration as 
well as the second nuclear crisis faced during the Bush administration in the early 2000s. 
The back and forth tit for tat that occurred between President Trump and Kim Jung-un had 
the United States on the brink of war with North Korea in 2017. In the initial months 
following President Trump’s inauguration, his administration conducted a comprehensive 
review of American policy regarding North Korean and continued with the Obama 
administration strategic patience policy until adopting the maximum pressure strategy.191 
During the timeframe that the Trump administration was developing its policy 
strategy for North Korea, South Korean leadership were facing domestic challenges that 
presented problems regarding U.S.–ROK relations. However, once the domestic problems 
were resolved President Trump and South Korea’s interim President Hwang Kyo-ahn 
agreed that the best way to enforce policy concerning North Korea would be on a unified 
front, responding to North Korean provocations firmly and jointly.192 The United States 
increased its military presence on the Korean peninsula and conducted annual joint military 
exercises with South Korea. The actions carried out by the United States were by design to 
ramp up the pressure on North Korea as part of the maximum pressure strategy regardless 
of the outcome. 
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson made an official visit to Japan and South Korea to 
give regional allies an update on the administration North Korean policy review and 
reiterated the strength required within the alliance to invoke a stronger policy of CVID to 
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denuclearize North Korea.193 Throughout the course of the official visits made by U.S. 
diplomats in the beginning of the Trump administration, U.S. officials made it clear that 
addressing the issue of nuclear proliferation on the Koran peninsula was a top U.S. policy 
concern. U.S. State Department Officials noted during a press briefing that “all options 
were on the table” for achieving CVID regarding North Korea.194  
Unbothered by the various UNSCR’s that were already adopted in respect to North 
Korea which placed harsher economic restrictions on the country, North Korea continued 
to ramp up provocations in 2017. There were four ballistic missiles launched in March by 
North Korea, which flew 1,000 kilometers and landed in the Japanese Economic Exclusive 
Zone, off the coast of Japan, and two unsuccessful tests conducted in April.195 The ballistic 
missile tests conducted by North Korea sparked an outrage within the Trump 
administration as things had begun to heat up militarily. After the failed test that were 
conducted in April the United States decided to deploy the USS Carl Vinson to the Korean 
peninsula as a coercive deterrent measure. The USS Carl Vinson joined the guided missile 
submarine USS Michigan and immediately began joint military exercises with South Korea 
in the Sea of Japan.196 
In continuance of applying coercive measures on North Korea, the United States 
deployed THAAD to South Korea with the first launchers becoming operational in May 
2017.197 The decision to deploy THAAD to the Korean peninsula was made during the 
Obama administration as a security measure for South Korea. THAAD is an anti-ballistic 
missile defense system that can destroy incoming missiles through collision, with a range 
of 200 kilometers capable of reaching 150 kilometers in altitude.198 North Korea perceived 
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the deployment of THAAD and the U.S.–ROK joint military exercises as a threat to the 
security of their nation. Throughout the history of U.S.–DPRK interactions, whenever the 
U.S.–ROK conducts routine military exercises, North Korea would respond with threats or 
weapons demonstrations. This time was no different, as North Korea conducted a 
Hwasong-12 missile test in May with a range of 4,800 kilometers following U.S.–ROK 
joint military exercises.199 The ballistic missile tests conducted by North Korea were 
occurring simultaneously with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s visit to Seoul, Tokyo, and 
Beijing to discuss U.S. policy implementation with respect to North Korea. Upon the 
conclusion of Secretary Tillerson’s visit to China he issued the following statement 
“cooperate with China to pressure North Korea when you can, and pressure China, in turn, 
to pressure the North when you must.”200 
2. 2017 UN Security Council Resolutions 
The United States responded to the weapons testing conducted in March, April, and 
May, by placing sanctions on North Korean entities known for supporting North Korea’s 
weapons program. North Korea tested its Hwasong-14 ballistic missile in July of 2017, and 
on July 28 tested an intercontinental ballistic missile that indicated ranges capable of 
striking the United States mainland.201 As a response to the continued weapons testing, 
and increased provocations directed at the United States’ regional allies from North Korea, 
the United Nations adopted four additional Security Council Resolutions in 2017. President 
Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping reached an agreement at a summit meeting in April 
2017 in which China agreed to cooperate with the United States and increase security 
measures regarding sanctions against North Korea.202 However, following the July ICBM 
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test conducted by North Korea, President Trump criticized China via twitter stating that 
“China is doing nothing for us with regard to North Korea.”203  
A component of the Trump administration maximum pressure campaign is to lean 
harder on Beijing because of the economic leverage that China has over North Korea. 
Although President Trump criticized China in April 2017, China backed the harder 
sanctions implemented on North Korea in late 2017. The first major UNSCR imposed 
during the Trump administration was resolution 2371 in response to North Koreas July 28th 
ICBM test and made effective on August 5, 2017.204 The resolution imposed a ban on 
North Korea’s coal, iron, iron ore, lead, lead ore and seafood exports, as well as prohibited 
new or expanded joint ventures.205 China used the harsher sanctions imposed on North 
Korea as a tool to convince North Korea  to act accordingly with Sino–DPRK common 
interests of adhering to the international order.206 The vicious cycle between the United 
States and the DPRK had begun and with each test conducted economic sanctions were 
enforced on North Korea. The remaining UNSCRs adopted in 2017 were 2375 and 2397 
which placed restrictions on refined petroleum products, banned natural gas liquids to the 
DPRK, and imposed bans on the export of textiles.207  
F. WAR WITH WORDS 
As the pressure increased on North Korea through the application of UNSCRs, 
President Trump used the social media website Twitter as a forum to express his viewpoints 
to his constituents regarding North Korea’s actions. There were several demeaning 
exchanges of words between President Trump and Kim Jung-un in 2017, but things did not 
begin to heat up until after the July ICBM test was conducted by North Korea. President 
Trump announced in August that he would “unleash fire and fury against North Korea if 
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they threatened the United States”.208 The comments made by President Trump was an 
indication that the United States was prepared to fight “fire with fire.” Later, President 
Trump, while speaking at the United Nations in September 2017 “vowed to totally destroy 
North Korea” if they threatened the United States.209  
The hostility that transpired between Washington and Pyongyang appeared to have 
no known end date in 2017. President Trump tweeted in October 2017, that Secretary of 
State Tillerson was “wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man.”210 Kim 
Jung-un responded to the negative comments made by President Trump calling him a 
“mentally deranged dotard” with the threat that he would “turn Washington, the stronghold 
of the American imperialist and the nest of evil, and its followers, into a sea of fire”.211 
Amidst the hostile remarks made by President Trump and the continued incitements by 
North Korea, President Trump often times sang his praises respecting Kim Jung-un giving 
admiration to his ability to lead a country at such a young age.  
1. Diplomatic Approach: Summit Meetings 
As President Trump’s derogatory tweets continued, the North Korean leader shifted 
his approach and delivered his annual New Year’s speech in January 2018 in which he 
expressed his willingness for reconciliation with South Korea to minimize the possible 
bloodshed that could occur during the 2018 Olympics if the U.S.–ROK joint military 
exercises continued.212 South Korean President Moon wanted to improve inter-Korean 
relations therefore he maximized on the opportunity to accomplish his objective after 
hearing Kim Jung-un’s New Year speech. Most leaders would have perceived the message 
delivered by Kim Jung-un as a threat, however President Moon saw it as an opportunity at 
diplomacy. President Trump, however perceived the comments made in the speech 
 
208 Debs and Monteiro, “Cascading Chaos in Nuclear Northeast Asia,” 102. 
209 Debs and Monteiro, 102. 
210 Debs and Monteiro, 102. 
211 Oriana S. Mastro, “Conflict and Chaos on the Korean Peninsula: Can China’s Military Help 
Secure North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons?,” International Security 43, no. 2 (November 7, 2018): 84–116. 
212 Jackson, On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War, 170. 
57 
regarding the United States as a threat from Kim Jung-un, and in response to this perceived 
threat President Trump tweeted the following statement:  
North Korean Leader Kim Jung-un stated that the ‘Nuclear button is on his 
desk at all times.’ Will someone from his depleted and food starved regime 
please tell him that I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & 
more powerful one than his, and my Button works!213 
In the past, many of President Trump’s constituents supported the comments that 
he tweeted regarding North Korea and Kim Jung-un however, in response to the above 
tweet most people expressed disappointment, and considered the statement 
unpresidential.214 The statements made by President Trump throughout 2017, however, 
likely, may have contributed to the summit meetings that soon followed in 2018.  
South Korean President Moon had already begun the steps of repairing relations 
with North Korea to guide the two countries into a more civilized and diplomatic direction. 
Following the New Year speech made by the North Korean leader, South Korea proposed 
high level talks with North Korea, and invited Kim Jung-un to the Olympic games being 
held in South Korea.215 The Trump administration stood firm on its maximum pressure 
strategy concerning North Korea and were hesitant to change the United States posture 
regarding the regime. Nevertheless, dialogue between the North and South continued thus 
making it harder for the United States to implement its maximum pressure policy 
effectively. With the threat of preventive military action by the United States at North 
Korea, and the belief that South Korea should shape the future of the Korean Peninsula, 
President Moon worked to facilitate the summit meetings between President Trump and 
Kim Jung-un.216  
President Trump announced that there would be a summit meeting between him 
and Kim Jung-un making him the first United States president to accept an invitation for a 
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one on one meeting with a North Korean leader in almost two decades.217 This 
announcement brought hope to the international community as well as U.S. regional allies 
about the possibility of developing a peaceful solution to the escalatory actions that 
occurred throughout 2017. The first summit meeting held in June 2018, resulted in 
President Trump and Kim Jung-un signing a vague agreement to work together to 
denuclearize the Korean peninsula.218 The ideas stipulated in the agreement as 
summarized were improved U.S.–DPRK and inter-Korean relations.219 Each leader also 
agreed to move forward with Nuclear diplomacy and conduct further summits in the future.  
Although the June 2018 summit meeting was a positive step forward to improve 
U.S.–DPRK relations and denuclearize the Korean peninsula, the statement did not address 
North Korea’s ballistic missile program. Nonetheless, there was still progress made 
regarding denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, which would go a long way to 
decreasing the threat North Korea poses to U.S. national security. Following the summit 
meeting President Trump announced the suspension of U.S.–ROK annual military 
exercises calling them “war games, and provocative” in nature.220 Kim Jung-un showed 
good faith as North Korea began dismantling a missile engine test site in July 2018.221 
History in a significant context was being made between the United States and North Korea 
like the world had never before seen throughout the past decades of U.S.–DPRK relations.  
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Keeping with the promise of continued diplomatic relations, U.S. Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo visited Pyongyang in early July 2018 and met with Kim Yong Chol to 
implement steps moving forward for diplomatic relations between Washington and 
Pyongyang.222 Shortly after the meeting occurred, North Korea denounced the United 
States for making a unilateral approach regarding denuclearization of the Korean 
peninsula, and felt the demands were one-sided.223 Although North Korea ceased testing 
ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons as an act of goodwill throughout the negotiation 
process, there was evidence that suggested they were still conducting illicit activities. The 
Diplomat revealed information pertaining to a secret North Korean clandestine uranium 
enrichment site in July 2018, and this information was backed by a United States 
government source.224 As a result of the lack of progress on North Korea’s behalf to 
dismantle its nuclear weapons program which was stipulated in the agreement following 
the Trump-Kim summit, the United States declined to continue further discussions with 
North Korea. 
Formal negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang withered away for the 
remainder of 2018, as the focus shifted to the next Trump-Kim summit, which was to take 
place in 2019. Meanwhile, South Korea and North Korea continued to develop their 
diplomatic relationship throughout 2018, taking strides to repair inter-Korean relations 
through high level talks, which led to the North-South presidential summit.225 The Hanoi 
summit took place in February of 2019, between President Trump and Kim Jung-un, but 
yielded no conclusive results. The meeting was scheduled to last two days between the 25‒
27th, however the meeting ended early as each party were unable to resolve differences 
over the scope of denuclearization measures and U.S. concessions.226 Following the abrupt 
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end of the Hanoi summit, the United States and North Korea reported that both parties 
parted amicably, and will continue to move forward with productive dialogues.227 
2. The Decline of Maximum Pressure 
After nearly a one-year hiatus from weapons testing, North Korea began conducting 
weapons test in May of 2019, however, President Trump did not consider the weapons 
testing to be a breach of trust by Kim Jung-un, and insisted that he maintained a positive 
relationship with Kim Jung-un.228 Tensions between Washington and Pyongyang 
decreased throughout 2018 and early 2019, as the Trump administration felt they were 
making progress in relation to denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. President Trump and 
Kim Jung-un had held several summit meetings to negotiate the disarmament of North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and although the Hanoi summit ended without a formal 
agreement being met, follow-on discussions were set to take place. President Trump and 
Kim Jung-un met in the Demilitarized Zone between South Korea and North Korea in June 
2019 and agreed to continue negotiations within the weeks that followed the meeting.229 
U.S.–DPRK negotiations regarding the North’s nuclear weapons program had 
begun to stall out in 2019. The promises that were delivered as a result of Trump-Kim 
interactions regarding continued negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang were 
essentially non-existent following the last meeting inside the Demilitarized Zone. As 
mentioned above President Trump did not consider the short-range missile tests that were 
conducted in early 2019 by North Korea as an act of defiance against the international order 
however, North Korea had begun to test submarine launched missiles and this warranted a 
different response. In early October 2019, North Korea demonstrated the ability to launch 
submarine ballistic missiles. This test launch was followed by another demonstration in 
late October of two projectiles that landed in the Sea of Japan just outside of Japan’s 
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Economic Exclusive Zone and east of South Korea.230 The test has raised security 
concerns in both South Korea and Japan about the rising capabilities of North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program, causing both countries to increase readiness and monitoring for 
further weapons testing by the DPRK.231  
Inactivity between the Trump administration and North Korea regarding the 
continuance of negotiations resulted in Kim Jung-un giving the United States an end of 
year deadline in 2019 to re-commence negotiations with North Korea and make right by 
the concessions that were discussed during the first summit meeting.232 However the 
United States never agreed to an end of year deadline with North Korea, and the stipulations 
contained within the first agreement following the Trump-Kim summit were vague 
throughout. North Korea decided to discontinue talks with the United States in 2019, 
because the UNSC did not provide the country with sanction relief as proposed by China 
and Russia. To maintain peace in East Asia, as an act of good faith to North Korea, the 
United States agreed to a temporarily halt of the U.S.–ROK military exercises in 2019.233 
As of writing this thesis there has been no significant progress made regarding 
denuclearizing the Korean peninsula—North Korea believes that the United States are 
using stall tactics to keep them engaged in dialogue—the United States and the rest of the 
World are dealing with the outbreak of the corona virus—North Korea has continued with 
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G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter review of U.S. policy in relation to North Korea from 2008 until the 
present highlighted the challenges that both President Obama and President Trump 
encountered during their terms. The Obama administration applied strategic patience by 
gradually escalating nonviolent means of coercion, through the implementation of 
economic sanctions to achieve the goal of CVID. The strategic patience policy applied in 
relation to North Korea in the beginning of the Obama administration was employed 
tactfully. However, the escalated acts of aggression that occurred between the ROK and 
DPRK drove President Obama to shift the U.S. policy of strategic patience from a 
diplomatic posture to a confrontational posture, and this inhibited U.S. policy progress. 
The main drivers that influenced U.S. policy was North Korea’s insistence for the United 
States to provide the country with economic sanction relief and concessions, which was 
done so with a threatening posture to the United States’ regional allies. The threatening 
posture that was directed at Japan and South Korea, combined with North Korea’s 
continued defiance of UNSCR’s drove U.S. policy direction. China showed support to the 
Obama administration by supporting UNSCRs imposed on North Korea but did their best 
to prevent the United States from crippling the DPRK’s economy by diluting the 
restrictions contained within the resolutions.  
President Trump’s maximum pressure strategy had the United States on the brink 
of a nuclear war with North Korea throughout the first year of his term. The back and forth 
actions between Washington and Pyongyang reached an all-time high throughout 2017 and 
did not begin to subside until mid-2018. The assertive personality of President Trump and 
the rhetoric he directed at Kim Jung-un via the social media platform twitter was 
reciprocated by Kim Jung-un, which further escalated the issues between Washington and 
Pyongyang. While the interactions transpired between President Trump and Kim Jung-un, 
North Korea increased its weapons testing and belligerent posture. These provocations 
drove the United States to increase unilateral and bilateral economic sanctions as well as 
increasing U.S. military presence within the region. North Korea’s recalcitrant behavior 
led China to support the harsher economic sanctions imposed on North Korea as part of 
the maximum pressure strategy. This was the first time in three decades that China gave 
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the United States its full support without any resistance regarding imposing harsher 
sanctions on North Korea. However, things took an extreme turn in 2018 with Kim Jung-
un’s New Year speech, which opened the door to inter-Korean diplomacy. This turn in 
events inspired the President of South Korea to bridge the gap between the United States 
and North Korea and led to the various Trump-Kim summit meetings. The interactions that 
occurred between the United States and North Korea were historical in context but led to 
little concrete changes. At present, North Korea is still developing its nuclear weapons 
program along with other weapons of mass destruction. 
The common trend present during the Obama and Trump administration were the 
surge in weapons testing by North Korea which allowed for the country to boost its nuclear 
weapons capabilities. Although this trend was present during each administration the 
largest rise in Pyongyang’s’ weapons arsenal occurred during the Obama administration. 
This driver although present during both administrations, weighed more heavily during 
President Trump’s first year in office as indicated by the increased hostility between 
Washington and Pyongyang. However, North Korea achieved the goal of striking the 
United States mainland in 2017 during the Trump administration. An additional trend that 
was present for the duration of the Obama administration which was also present for the 
period of both the Clinton and Bush administrations was China’s resistance to imposing 
harsher sanctions on North Korea. This common driver ended with the Trump 
administration maximum pressure strategy because China has given the United States its 
full support and has imposed harsher economic sanctions on North Korea as well.   
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U.S. policy employed regarding North Korea from 1992 until the present day 
consisted of engagement, hardline diplomacy, strategic patience, and maximum pressure, 
each with the goal of preventing North Korea from advancing its nuclear technologies. 
However, the United States’ attempts ultimately failed to prevent North Korea from 
advancing its nuclear weapons program, which is evidenced by the nuclear arsenal that 
North Korea currently possesses. This thesis evaluated four potential drivers of U.S. policy 
in relation to North Korea from the Clinton administration to the Trump administration to 
determine which drivers had more influence on executing U.S. policy objectives of a 
nuclear free North Korea. The four explanations of drivers were the lack of consistency 
depending on each presidential administration’s national security interests, China’s 
economic leverage over North Korea, the United States’ bilateral military alliances with 
South Korea and Japan, and North Korea’s provocations and disregard for international 
order.  
A review of U.S. foreign policy concerning North Korea from the Clinton 
administration to the Trump administration (1992–2020) presented multiple drivers of U.S. 
policy for each presidential administration. For nearly three decades the way that the 
United States has engaged with North Korea regarding its nuclear weapons program is 
through a series of economic sanctions to inhibit the DPRK’s ability to acquire material 
and technology to expand its nuclear weapons program. These economic sanctions were 
implemented to place financial strain on North Korea to achieve the goal of non-nuclear 
proliferation on the Korean peninsula. Throughout the timeframe evaluated each 
presidential administration imposed a combination of unilateral and bilateral sanctions on 
North Korean entities and on the country itself to coerce North Korea from pursuing 
nuclear proliferation, as well as increased military presence within the region, annual U.S.–
ROK exercises, and military exercises with Japan.  
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A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The Clinton administration faced the challenge of preventing North Korea from 
withdrawing from the NPT in 1993 to start a nuclear weapons program. Intelligence proved 
that North Korea had developed a secret nuclear weapons program and were actively 
reprocessing uranium from spent fuel rods, which lead to the 1994 nuclear crisis.234 There 
were multiple drivers of policy that impeded American policy with respect to North Korea 
during President Clinton’s term in office from 1992–2000. The first driver was China’s 
influence over North Korea which made it difficult to effectively impose harsher sanctions 
on North Korea for fear of an economic downfall. The second driver was South Korea and 
Japan made it difficult to accomplish U.S. policy objectives by refusing to back harsh 
sanctions for fear that it may lead to war. Japan feared the retaliation that may occur from 
North Korea if the UNSC enforced harsher economic sanctions and South Korea wanted a 
diplomatic approach versus coercion through sanctions. There were many North Korean 
sympathizers within Japan that provided North Korea with financial aid which directly 
impacted the effectiveness of sanctions. The last driver of American policy in relation to 
North Korea was North Korea’s confrontational posture regarding the international order. 
The country wanted concessions and security guarantees from the United States to prevent 
North Korea from withdrawing from the NPT and comply with IAEA inspections. In 
response to the above drivers, the Clinton administration chose to pursue bilateral 
negotiations to prevent a war between the United States and North Korea and this 
diplomatic approach is what led to the 1994 Agreed Framework deal.  
The Bush administration was confronted with the same challenge as the Clinton 
administration, which was to prevent North Korea from withdrawing from the NPT. There 
were several drivers that hampered the Bush administration North Korean policy, which 
prevented the goal of achieving CVID. President Bush labelled “North Korea as an axis of 
evil in his 2002 State of the Union address” and later stated that “he would not certify the 
North’s compliance with all provisions of the Agreed Framework deal.,” as a result of 
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North Korea’s illicit activities.235 The drastic switch from the Clinton administration 
engagement strategy to the Bush administration hardline strategy lacked policy consistency 
concerning North Korea because it required a harder stance and consisted of increased 
sanctions and coercive measures versus diplomacy. North Korea’s belligerent posture to 
the international order combined with their dissatisfaction with the lack of attention and 
concessions they were getting from the United States resulted in their withdrawal from the 
NPT in 2003. This decision also made it difficult to affect the desired outcome of a nuclear 
free Korean peninsula. An additional driver of U.S. policy was China’s lack of support for 
the United States decision to impose harsher economic sanctions on North Korea. North 
Korea’s threatening posture to Japan and South Korea is what drove the United States to 
considering military action as a policy option because of the bilateral military alliances that 
obligate the United States to provide security to these allies.  
The Obama administration was encountered with the initial task of convincing 
North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions; however, after North Korea conducted its 
second underground nuclear weapons test the United States was again faced with the 
pressing challenge of denuclearizing North Korea. There were three drivers of American 
policy regarding North Korea for the period of the Obama administration. The first driver 
was North Korea’s threatening posture toward the United States regional allies’—Japan 
and South Korea, and its continual defiance of UNSCRs by continuing its illicit activities. 
Another driver was North Korea’s acts of aggression carried out against South Korea in 
2010, which resulted in the loss of life of military members. These acts of aggression led 
to increased tensions between the North and the South and intensified regional instability. 
This was an additional driver of U.S. policy during this time because of South Korea’s 
anger over North Korea’s actions. Therefore, the United States was faced with preventing 
South Korea from launching a counterattack on the DPRK. The Obama administration was 
forced to abandon the bilateral negotiations that were ongoing between Washington and 
Pyongyang and shift U.S. policy in relation to North Korea from one of diplomacy to a 
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more confrontational approach. The final driver of U.S. policy was China’s insistence on 
watering-down the security resolutions to avoid the economic fallout of North Korea. 
Although China supported the many UNSCR’s that were imposed on North Korea during 
the Obama administration more so than his predecessors, China insisted on preventing the 
Obama administration from imposing too harsh sanctions on North Korea.  
President Trump was met with the difficulty of denuclearizing and preventing 
North Korea from achieving the nuclear capabilities to strike the United States mainland. 
During 2017, tensions between Washington and Pyongyang reached an all-time high and 
led to a dramatic increase in weapons demonstrations from North Korea. The maximum 
pressure strategy that was employed in respect to North Korea increased economic 
sanctions on the country and military presence within the region. The Trump administration 
skipped the diplomatic step and immediately led with a confrontational approach in 
strategy concerning North Korea. Throughout 2017 there was an escalation of the “war 
with words” between President Trump and Kim Jung-un which had the United States on 
the brink of war with North Korea. This resulted in the back and forth actions between 
Washington and Pyongyang of increased sanctions followed by the provocative actions of 
increased weapons testing. North Korea’s unruly behavior led China to support harsher 
economic sanctions imposed on North Korea as part of the maximum pressure strategy.  
However, in January 2018, Kim Jung-un delivered his annual New Year’s speech 
which appeared to take on a diplomatic tone.236 This speech opened the doorway to inter-
Korean relations between North Korea and South Korea, which led to the Trump-Kim 
summit meetings that followed. It is not completely clear why the North Korean leader 
decided to change his strategy from a confrontational stance to a diplomatic approach, but 
many speculate that the sudden switch in North Korea’s behavior occurred because the 
country achieved their goal of second-strike capability. Whatever the cause for the sudden 
switch in North Korean behavior it led to the Trump administration changing its approach 
to a more diplomatic stance. Tensions between Washington and Pyongyang declined 
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throughout 2018 well into 2019 because of the summit meetings that were occurring 
between President Trump and Kim Jung-un. As of late the United States has not succeeded 
in denuclearizing North Korea, and negotiations have been stalled since the Hanoi summit, 
which occurred in 2019.  
While conducting American policy review from the Clinton administration until 
the present there were some trends that remained consistent throughout the different 
administrations. The first trend was North Korea’s confrontational posture during each 
administration, which was used to grasp the United States attention and coerce the United 
States into providing them with concessions. Although this approach did not work 
favorably for North Korea regarding U.S. policy strategies that were employed from 1992 
until the present, the consistent provocations did drive U.S. policy toward North Korea. 
Another trend that was present was China’s insistence on preventing the U.S. from 
imposing too harsh sanctions on North Korea. The final trend present was U.S. allies’ 
security concerns pertaining to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  
Out of the four explanations of drivers regarding U.S. policy in relation to North 
Korea each played an important role in policy, however, the drivers that weighed the 
heaviest throughout each administration was China’s leverage over the DPRK and 
addressing U.S. regional allies’ security concerns regarding North Korea. Though the 
findings show that intervention from Beijing regarding U.S.–DPRK relations has worked 
favorably for the United States in the past, Beijing’s insistence on preventing the United 
States from imposing harsh restrictions on North Korea stymied U.S. policy in east Asia. 
China has always favored a diplomatic approach to U.S. policy concerning North Korea 
instead of a confrontational approach, and studies have shown that Beijing has been a major 
factor in terms of negotiating with North Korea, which is evidenced by the Agreed 
Framework and Leap Day deals.  
U.S. policymakers recognize the security dilemmas on the Korean peninsula, and 
when entering into dealings regarding the DPRK, regional allies’ security and the safety of 
U.S. troops are often at the forefront of negotiations.237  Japan and South Korea have been 
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under the constant pressure of feeling threatened by North Korea’s actions and insistence 
on evolving its weapons capabilities, which has been a consistent cause of concern for U.S. 
policy toward North Korea. The studies have shown that whenever there is an increase in 
North Korea’s provocations toward U.S. allies’, the United States responds by applying 
coercive measures toward North Korea, which voids out diplomacy. The United States then 
turns to the UNSC to invoke resolutions or harsher security measures to existing resolutions 
on North Korea for defying the international order. Typically, China would insist on 
preventing the United States from imposing too harsh sanctions on North Korea for fear of 
an economic collapse, therefore Beijing would enter into dialogue with the United States 
to further its agenda of a diplomatic solution.  
The best combination of factors that contributed to successful outcomes regarding 
U.S. policy toward North Korea have been achieved by pressuring China into intervening 
or through multilateral diplomacy consisting of the United States, South Korea, Japan, and 
China. The best timeframe for the United States to prevent the North Korean problem 
occurred during the Clinton and Bush administrations because North Korea had not yet 
developed its nuclear arsenal. Of equal importance is that this combination of factors was 
applied during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations and contributed to the 1994 
Agreed Framework, the 2005 joint statement, and the 2012 Leap Day deal. The Clinton 
administration’s diplomatic approach led to the 1994 Agreed Framework deal and was 
arguably the best deal brokered between Washington and Pyongyang, which if upheld 
during the Bush administration would have probably prevented North Korea from pursuing 
its nuclear ambitions. Although the agreement was short lived, the 2005 joint statement 
was reached through the multilateral negotiations that were coined the six-party talks. 
Furthermore, during the Obama administration multilateral talks between the United 
States, South Korea, and North Korea is what contributed to the outcome of the 2012 Leap 
Day deal. These cases are an indication that the deals brokered between the United States 
and North Korea were reached through joint interaction between the United States, its 
allies’, and China. 
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B. FUTURE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis examined American policy regarding North Korea over the span of three 
decades and evaluated the various strategies applied by each presidential administration 
while analyzing the factors that drove U.S. policy. The policy review exhibited several 
challenges present during each administration which contributed to the execution of U.S. 
policy concerning North Korea. The North Korea conundrum has prevented U.S. 
policymaker efforts as well as the global nuclear non-proliferation regime efforts of 
enforcing the NPT. The United States policy in relation to denuclearizing North Korea has 
cycled between appeasement (carrot), and engagement (stick) based off the soft and 
hardline strategies employed by the DPRK.238 In the past, the United States has appeased 
North Korea by offering concessions such as economic sanctions relief, or financial 
assistance, and in return North Korea would make promises of dismantling its weapons 
program. The stick refers to the coercive measures that the United States would employ 
concerning North Korea such as increased economic sanctions, military exercises, and 
more military presence within the region. Based off this assessment there are two possible 
recommendations for the United States to engage with North Korea in the future—an 
option of appeasement that centers on diplomacy or an option of pressure that relies on a 
combination of coercive strategies.  
Secretary Tillerson stated that the United States must “cooperate with China to 
pressure North Korea when we can, and pressure China, in turn, to pressure the North when 
we must.”239 The first option of engaging with North Korea through nuclear diplomacy 
would consist of the United States, China, South Korea, and Japan working together in 
conjunction to compel North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. This 
strategy would center around providing North Korea with suitable concessions, economic 
sanction relief from the UNSC, and security guarantees from the United States. These 
methods have been employed by the United States in the past however, they have not been 
employed in unification with China, Japan, and South Korea, nor have they been employed 
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to the full extent. The current relationship that President Trump has developed with Kim 
Jung-un places the United States in the unique position of increased bargaining power with 
the regime. If the United States were to concert a small portion of effort with respect to 
continuing negotiations with North Korea the United States may be able to achieve its goal 
of CVID.  
The process of engaging with North Korea through nuclear diplomacy would 
consist of four steps. The first action would be resuming six-party talks and clearly 
discussing the definition of CVID to ensure that there is not any ambiguity regarding the 
terms of the agreement. The second phase would be to gradually lift unilateral U.S. 
sanctions against the DPRK, and multilateral UNSCRs on North Korea. The third move is 
to discontinue the annual U.S.–ROK and U.S.–Japan military exercises within the Korean 
peninsula indefinitely as an act of good will. This is a critical step because it would provide 
North Korea with security assurance from the United States. The final phase of this plan is 
to provide North Korea with assistance to build up its economic infrastructure through 
financial aid and humanitarian assistance.  
In return for the concessions provided to North Korea, Pyongyang would dismantle 
its nuclear weapons program, turn over nuclear material to the IAEA, and agree to re-sign 
the NPT and uphold the safeguards as stipulated by agreeing to random inspections of 
known nuclear facilities. Although this would be a costly plan for all members required to 
provide the finances to appease North Korea, this plan would also have an impact on North 
Korea because its security will depend on the United States upholding the terms of the 
agreement. The United States will not be able to use this agreement as a bargaining chip to 
thwart other illicit activities conducted by North Korea unless it is stipulated within the 
agreement.  
The second option of applying pressure to China to convince North Korea would 
consists of a confrontational posture and will require the United States, South Korea, Japan, 
and U.S. allied members of the UNSC to exert influence of the full extent possible. This 
plan may be met with resistance from China because it would consist of imposing 
secondary sanctions on China. It may also provoke North Korea to retaliate in response to 
the coercive methods that the United States will be required to employ. It will also go 
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against one of China’s core national interest of a stabilized Korean peninsula and an 
economically prosperous North Korea. However, if the goal of the United States remains 
to achieve CVID from North Korea, then coercing North Korea via the application of 
pressure on China to intervene may be the viable option.  
The coercive strategies that will be employed are much like the Trump 
administration maximum pressure strategy but would be applied gradually. The first phase 
will consist of imposing maximum unilateral sanctions on the North Korean regime by the 
United States. The second phase implemented will involve South Korea and Japan 
imposing harsher sanctions on North Korea. Japan is North Korea’s second-largest trading 
partner, therefore Japan ceasing bilateral trade with North Korea will likely impact North 
Korea’s economy. The third and fourth phases will occur simultaneously and comprise of 
imposing secondary sanctions on any country that conducts business with North Korea—
including China, and redeploying tactical nuclear weapons back to South Korea, while 
increasing U.S. military exercises and presence within the region. The purpose behind this 
option is to push North Korea further into international isolation, by maximizing on 
China’s fears by inciting an economic downfall in Pyongyang to provoke Beijing into 
intervening with the North Korean problem. 
Either option presented above could potentially be an executable option to protect 
U.S. national security interests in East Asia. However, to ensure that U.S. national interest 
does not conflict with regional allies’ national interests, option one would alleviate any 
security concerns from South Korea, and Japan that may arise from the threat of war that 
option two could lead to. The pattern that was present throughout the administrations 
evaluated in this thesis was regional allies feared the threat that would transpire from North 
Korea if the United States actions provoked a war on the Korean peninsula. Option one 
will probably come under scrutiny by critics because it hinges on the United States 
providing concessions to North Korea despite its wayward actions and behavior. On the 
other hand, option two will be met with scrutiny by China, because it may ignite an 
economic crisis in North Korea—with catastrophic consequences. These concerns must be 
evaluated by U.S. policymakers to determine which of the above options would be the 
preferable course of action to achieve the goal of a nuclear free Korean peninsula.  
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